Large tech companies participating in armed conflicts is nothing new, but the Russo-Ukrainian war might be the first in which their direct and central role is truly manifested. Moreover, the consequences of private companies getting involved not based on government directives but by their own choice are also shown for the first time. Tech companies are dominating ever more areas of crucial importance to maintaining the territorial integrity of a state, including cyber security, satellite imaging, internet access and information surveillance. While previously, faster progress in areas such as cyber defense was driven by the public sector, the private sector has become the engine of progress by now. All signs point to the tendency that regardless of the size of a country's defense budget, modern weapons systems can only be created and operated together with civilian technology.
The Russo-Ukrainian war is a field of experiment for the military, intelligence and defense mega-companies of the US and its allies. Several weapons operated by new technologies and systems supporting artificial intelligence are being transported to Ukraine such as drones, self-driving vehicles, ammunition, communication and geo-information intelligence systems.
The cloud services of Amazon, for example, have played a key role in evacuating the data of the Ukrainian government prior to the war. IT companies such as Microsoft and ESET provide the cyber defense of Ukrainian governmental and civil networks from Russian attacks. Google gives services that support the functioning of the Ukrainian government as it ensures the protection of government websites and embassies. These companies, as well as a host of smaller private and civil organizations, either offer their services pro bono or are financed by the Western governments supporting Ukraine. None of them have made the headlines like Starlink, and the reason is not just the absence of mind-blowing Twitter vote hype generated by Elon Musk, but because these companies, unlike Starlink, have clearly picked a side. Private companies play a significant role in the cyber sector, telecommunications, and other areas, but like SpaceX, none of them have an actual commitment to do any of it. Simply put, companies provide services essential for the survival of Ukraine because they decide to do so following their own preference, not because they are ordered by any government.
The uncertainty surrounding Starlink, which provides internet service in Ukraine, highlights the vulnerabilities stemming from such dependencies. Starlink is a textbook example of big tech platforms holding power without accountability. Because of X’s ownership structure, Musk’s personal decisions allow him to become the master of space and the arbiter of life and death, too.
When Elon Musk ordered Starlink engineers to shut down the satellite system while the Ukrainian military was preparing a drone strike against a Russian warship in Crimea, he was basically acting like a head of government, except that he has no expert staff, competence, or accountability.
It is easy to imagine a war in which the same company provides services to both sides because of its business and commercial interests. Unlike X and SpaceX, the decision-makers of most companies are accountable to the board of directors and the shareholders. This means that in a future conflict involving, for instance, China, any potential loss of profits stemming from supporting the other side might be key in determining the loyalty of a big tech company. Once more, Elon Musk might be an example. Taiwan’s internet infrastructure would be very vulnerable in case of a Chinese invasion, but the Taiwanese government is hesitant to use Starlink due to
Musk’s business interests in China. As half of new Teslas are estimated to be manufactured in Shanghai, Taiwan fears that in case of pressure from Beijing Musk would simply switch off Starlink. Worse, he would post a vote on Twitter about the status of Taiwan.
That both sides at war are potentially supported by the same companies came up in the Russo-Ukrainian war, but it has not been proven. This February, military expert websites reported Russian volunteers of Donbas boasting on Telegram about purchasing Starlink terminals. In addition, Ukrainian military intelligence announced that the Russian side is also using the services of Starlink, but this claim has been denied by Musk and the Russians.
The experience in Ukraine suggests that tech companies will participate in the military conflicts of the future, but also that they will get involved differently in a place that is far from Western attention. This is especially so if public opinion does not support one side unambiguously, or the American government’s position is not aligned with corporate preferences.
Another question is the extent to which those affected by future conflicts are willing to secure these technologies on the best possible terms. The influx of tech companies to Ukraine was induced partly by the proactivity of Mihail Fedorov, 33-year-old Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation who emphasizes that the war offers them testing conditions that they cannot find elsewhere.
In the months following the war’s outbreak the Ukrainians accepted any and all help from foreign companies. Fedorov also recruited an "IT army" of 400 000 volunteers to protect critical Ukrainian infrastructure from Russian cyberattacks. Later on, through various tax reductions and other incentives, the government began to develop a tech sector based on the Israeli model. The objective is to invite Western companies to invest, and to make the sector an engine of economic growth in Ukraine after the end of the war.
As with every coin, however, there are two sides to consider. It is undeniable that Ukraine receives essential help from Western tech companies. At the same time, this necessitates providing access to sensitive information, which needs to be protected. The risks of data related to national security, critical infrastructure and information networks being leaked or falling into the wrong hands are growing by the day.
The above-mentioned tech companies support Ukraine on their own accord, and this is obviously affected by market concerns. Besides, all of them have done business with the US government, or there are future business arrangements in place. Good ties with the Biden-administration and the goal of maintaining them might make these companies get involved in a conflict if American national security interests are at stake.
As any private actor, Microsoft and other companies are naturally looking to sell their products and services. Rather than being Good Samaritans rushing to Ukraine’s rescue, they are actually paid millions of dollars by various Western governments. To be fair, several firms "donate" their technology to the Ukrainian government or give it away for free to the media.
Going back to the case of Starlink, even though Musk threatened to stop its services in Ukraine if the Pentagon does not pay ten million dollars per month, he eventually backed out. Though the service to Ukraine is financed more or less by Musk, the US government remains one of the biggest clients of SpaceX, and its missiles are used by NASA and the US army to launch military satellites.
Supporting Ukraine may urge companies to develop products and services faster, which gives them market advantage compared to competitors unaffected by such pressure. In Ukraine, the services of Microsoft, for instance, are constantly under Russian attacks, and by identifying and fixing the vulnerabilities discovered, Microsoft is having to improve its systems’ security to address the issues coming up in real time.
It is equally important to keep in mind that in a world of influencers and branding, participation in the Ukrainian conflict has itself become a matter of corporate branding. This is evidenced by the large number of posts on social media and corporate reports.
One might ask how the picture looks from the perspective of the public defense sector? Besides noting that private companies might become decisive factors in future conflicts, defense planners around the world know that procurement is rather inflexible and takes a long time, which means that the process cannot be changed overnight. Naturally, it is a reasonable expectation from the government to make sure that suppliers are viable in the long term. On the other hand, it is telling that Silicon Valley was never populated by start-ups engaged in defense technologies, as both entrepreneurs and investors were discouraged by the prospect of being caught in the contentious overseas conflicts of the US. They were equally deterred by the Pentagon's notoriously slow and risk-averse procurement process, which favors established defense contractors.
By now, it has become obvious that military effectiveness depends more and more on the information advantage provided by the most modern sensors, data processing and computing systems, but as these are all found in the private sector, there is a pressure on state defense agencies tasked with acquisition and development to seek out these actors. For venture capital, investing in defense start-ups was problematic and considered morally controversial, while the path to lucrative government contracts seemed too long and rocky to even try. This attitude is starting to change with the US’s gigantic, 886-billion-dollar defense budget for 2024, and the hope by startups that they can get a bigger slice of it.
The Russo-Ukrainian war also demonstrates that the legal regulation of the use of AI is still in its infancy. The violation of human rights and the right to privacy are inevitable corollaries of war, but in Ukraine this is compounded with questions related to the use of AI. The American facial recognition company Clearview AI provides free access to its services for Ukrainian detectives, allowing them to identify Ukrainians and Russians lost in the war. Then the Ukrainian detectives inform the families in Russia quite ruthlessly that their child was killed.
Perhaps few would think that the involvement of tech companies has international humanitarian law implications, but this is another aspect to consider. By default, tech companies, including their employees and properties, are considered civilians and thus cannot be attacked. However, this protection might be lost in some cases. If this happens, the employees become "directly involved in hostilities" and the company property becomes a "military target."
Overall, some of the companies involved in the Ukrainian conflict (such as Google or Microsoft) operate almost like an intelligence agency, yet their leaders – regardless of how they reached their position in the company – are, unlike public officials, unaccountable. It remains to be seen how and within what legal framework this emerging new digital world order can be managed, or even who would step up to do so in the first place.
The US-China rivalry permeates all areas of the tech sector, making it questionable whether Chinese companies would be willing to participate in developing a common set of rules and to upholding them afterwards. There are examples of (great) powers rising above their conflicts and regulating, however temporarily, a certain area, such as that of nuclear proliferation. The situation of tech companies is more complex, however, with more parties affected and their presence more deeply felt in the everyday lives of citizens. Moreover, these are non-state actors that would need to reach an agreement. Thus, the challenges keep piling up and the problem is here to stay as it concerns our present, and not our future.
This article was written in the framework of The Eastern Frontier Initiative (TEFI) project. TEFI is a collaboration of independent publishers from Central and Eastern Europe, to foster common thinking and cooperation on European security issues in the region. The project aims to promote knowledge sharing in the European press and contribute to a more resilient European democracy.
Members of the consortium are 444 (Hungary), Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland), SME (Slovakia), PressOne (Romania), and Bellingcat (The Netherlands).
The TEFI project is co-financed by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor EACEA can be held responsible for them.
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