Since autumn 2023, Russia has clearly taken the military initiative in the war, and it has become undeniable by today that Russia’s superiority is due to the lack of artillery ammunition and anti-aircraft equipment in Ukraine. The Russians are advancing slowly but steadily, behind a barrage of air and artillery strikes. They are suffering terrible losses, fighting for two or three weeks occasionally for a ridge near a small village and sacrificing 3-400 men and 20-30 tanks. The reason for the slow progress is the Ukrainian forces’ use of FPV drones, which deliver heavy blows to Russian attackers . Yet, the Ukrainians are unable to neutralize Russian artillery or air power, which they can do only with ammunition and missiles sent by Western countries.
But what happens if Russia wins? Knowing too well that the meaning of a ‘Russian victory’ is itself unclear, consider a situation, for the sake of simplicity, in which Russia seizes even more territory from Ukraine and is able to force Ukraine to recognise its territorial claims and renounce Western integration.
If Russia wins, it will not attack the European NATO members the next day for it lacks the strength to do so. 90 percent of the Russian ground forces that were available before the invasion are now on the casualty list, and all of the personnel that have since been conscripted are being deployed in Ukraine. The exceptions are the regulars conscripted twice a year, but they cannot be deployed outside the country's borders. To be sure, there have been instances in which troops were forced to sign a new contract and ended up in Ukraine as a result.
Contrary to Russian claims, Russian forces do not have large, intact reserves in remote parts of the country. The troops that used to be stationed at the Finnish border have disappeared, the only division-level unit capable of land warfare, the 11th Army Corps of the Baltic Fleet, have been taken from Kaliningrad, and all the division-level units of the Eastern Military District are likewise already engaged in Ukraine. The Russian ground forces, including the Marines and the airborne troops (VDV), do not pose a threat to NATO's European members and this will remain so until the end of the war. Of course, Russian air power and missile troops are still significant factors and NATO needs to be prepared for them.
Even if the Russian forces win in Ukraine, they will still need a year or two of rest, replenishment and re-training based on the war’s experience before they can pose a serious threat to Europe. After such a transitional period, however, Russia will emerge with a force that amassed serious combat experiences, and they need to be treated accordingly.
If Europe wants to be able to shape its own future, it must maintain or rebuild the capabilities required of great powers. Among these, Europe possesses some of the most important ones like population, economic strength and geographical endowments, but it seems to lack others like the ability and willingness to impose its will outside its territory. If necessary, a great power is able and willing to act on its interests not only by ‘soft’ means like money, diplomacy, and trade, but also through ‘hard’ means like violence.
The first thing Europe and NATO can do, or could have done, is to supply Ukraine with the necessary war material and military equipment in sufficient quantities. Currently, it is unlikely that Ukraine will have more and better weapons and material by the summer of 2024 than it has at present. It is unknown when the artillery ammunition promised by the Czechs will arrive and what effects the US aid package will have on the front line. The F-16 fighters offered by the Dutch and the Danish are essentially irrelevant as a few dozen of them do not make much of a difference. For that, Ukraine would need at least 40-50 modern, fourth-generation aircrafts that can be deployed continuously. Far more useful to the Ukrainians will be the arrival of artillery ammunition and anti-aircraft equipment that allows them to neutralize or at least undermine Russia’s two major strengths – its overwhelming air and artillery superiority.
If Ukraine is willing and able to fight for at least another year and a half, and if the West is able and willing to back it up with sufficient means, there is a chance that the Russians are stopped and even pushed back. Still, this is unlikely to be enough for restoring the original borders. For Ukraine, the quickest possible end to the war would be to recreate a situation like in early October 2022: after a strategic victory, Ukrainian artillery regains the upper hand and the tactical initiative is stripped from Russia. But to do so, the Ukrainians will have to kill twice as many people as the Russians can mobilize, which will require first wiping Russia’s air force out of the sky and suppressing its artillery as they did in the autumn of 2022. Given existing military realities, this can only happen if the West significantly increases its support to Ukraine.
If the West is unable or unwilling to send enough support, Ukraine is likely to lose the war in some form, which would vindicate Russia's strategy and its actions. In that case, Europe would have to defend its interests against a powerful Russia. To repeat, this can be prevented through the simple way of sending sufficient support to Ukraine.
If, for some reason, the West does not send sufficient support to Ukraine, it will have to help the Ukrainian army in another way – with soldiers. To avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations, this is not about sending combat troops. Hundreds of people are dying and being wounded every day, and nobody suggests throwing European NATO soldiers, especially Hungarians into the meat grinder. Still, it is worth thinking through the possible scenarios of Western soldiers entering the war.
To begin with, a large number of Ukrainian soldiers working in the hinterlands could be replaced with Western troops. The troops guarding the Belarusian and Transnistrian borders, or those securing the Odessa area, could be freed up and sent to the front to replace forces tired of months of fighting without relief.
If necessary, Western soldiers could also take over certain combat support functions. This would mean that cities, military installations and critical infrastructure would be protected by Western air defence teams while the Ukrainian air defence could concentrate on reducing Russian air superiority. European forces could carry out logistical tasks such as transport, repair, distribution, and medical assistance, particularly in areas west of the Dnieper. According to military principles, the provision of one fighting soldier requires input from 5-9 non-combat soldiers, depending on the exact calculations. This implies a significant resource burden on the war effort.
Intervention by military force raises a number of questions, the most obvious is whether this would mean war between NATO and Russia. There are many indications that it would not. In addition, Russian forces are simply incapable of fighting a larger war on top of the current one by, for example, closing the Suwalki crossing between Poland and Lithuania or attacking NATO members in the Baltics. Russian forces lack the necessary deployable forces for such an enterprise. Of course, the chance is always there. And if such a Russian attack were to take place after Ukraine’s defeat, then the Russians would be able to deploy a much larger force and have a greater shot at success.
The other question is whether Ukraine is willing to continue sacrificing people in the hundreds of thousands. If it is not, then Western soldiers should stay out of Ukraine. If it is, then they may go. Depending on estimates, about 20-30,000 soldiers equalling 10-15 brigades could be made available if NATO member states take charge of the hinterlands. But even so, there is no telling how much help this would practically mean to the Ukrainian war effort. A significant number of troops serving in the backlines are, for various reasons, unfit for combat service, and their likely sacrifice would not bring Ukrainian victory any closer.
Though their quality is questionable, these 10-15 brigades could be enough to hold off the Russians with the steady influx of Western support. This would still not be enough to achieve an operational success like back in October 2022, and certainly insufficient to force a restoration of the 1991 borders. That would require at least 1.5 million well-equipped and well-trained Ukrainian soldiers and a serious dent in Russian military capabilities.
In light of the above, answering the seemingly straightforward question of "sending troops to Ukraine" requires a reckoning by both NATO and its members states individually of the following dilemmas:
It cannot be denied that Ukraine is in an increasingly critical situation due to insufficient Western support and the persistence of the Russian military. From a military perspective, Ukraine's victory is based on two conditions: a maximization of external support and a possible military involvement. The latter raises complex, difficult and painful questions, and they need to be sorted out by the Alliance to figure out where it wants to be headed. To be clear, the view that Ukraine should be abandoned is a popular one in Hungary and beyond, which makes it a realistic scenario. In case that happens, however, European NATO members would have to be prepared for a much stronger Russian force, and for potentially putting the lives of their own citizens at stake, and no longer just those of Ukraine.
In the past two years, it has also become clear that Western self-constraint and fears of Russian "red lines" do not work, and that Ukraine’s defeat would leave Europe in a much more dangerous position than it is now. While many consider the idea of a limited Western intervention in Ukraine crazy, the real lunacy is to do the same thing over and over again and expect a different outcome. As we know, the strategy of appeasement failed in 1938, in 2014-15 and it did in 2021-22. And thus Europe, particularly the European NATO member states, will either step up and become a strong deterring force, or they will face a series of increasingly unsolvable problems.
The author is a military expert. He does not support the escalation of the current war or the sending of Hungarian troops to Ukraine. He also rejects the idea of any NATO member state participating in the conflict with combat troops.
This article was written in the framework of The Eastern Frontier Initiative (TEFI) project. TEFI is a collaboration of independent publishers from Central and Eastern Europe, to foster common thinking and cooperation on European security issues in the region. The project aims to promote knowledge sharing in the European press and contribute to a more resilient European democracy.
Members of the consortium are 444 (Hungary), Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland), SME (Slovakia), PressOne (Romania), and Bellingcat (The Netherlands).
The TEFI project is co-financed by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor EACEA can be held responsible for them.
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