As a result of several months of negotiations, the largest prisoner exchange since the Cold War took place in Turkey on August 1, involving seven countries and 24 adults (and indirectly two children, who knew nothing about their parents background). Although this was not Ankara's first diplomatic achievement in the Russia-Ukraine war, it was undoubtedly a complex operation that earned Turkey worldwide recognition, even though – understandably – all eyes were fixated on the prisoners themselves.
Mediation refers to the process where conflicting parties bring in a neutral third party to help them find a peaceful solution. However, it is important to note that success depends primarily on the willingness of the opposing parties to reach an agreement.
One of the key concepts in mediation is "ripeness", which refers to timing: whether the conflict is ripe for mediation and whether there is a realistic chance of resolution at a given point. This largely depends on the assessments of the parties themselves: as long as they perceive that the continuation of the conflict is in their favor, they are unlikely to seek a genuine compromise, or they will engage in negotiations just to keep up appearances.
As mediation is a costly and resource-intensive endeavor, few actors are willing to undertake it without sufficient motivation or self-interest. It is therefore important to examine the factors that drive those who offer mediation.
Turkey has extensive experience in mediating international conflicts. It is no surprise therefore that the role of mediator has long been a key element of Turkey's proactive foreign policy and its national identity. Successfully securing and performing mediation roles strengthens Turkey's image of power and influence, both domestically and internationally—a crucial aspect of Recep Tayyip Erdogan's foreign policy.
The Russia-Ukraine war is not by far the first conflict where Ankara takes up a mediator’s role: it mediated between Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2007, between Syria and Israel in 2008, between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2009, between Iran and the United States in 2010, and, more recently, in the war between Russia and Ukraine and between Somalia and Ethiopia.
The question may arise: how suitable Turkey is for the role of mediator in the war between Ukraine and Russia. What is certain is that Turkey is a major regional power that has long used mediation as a diplomatic instrument and has gained experience in this area. An additional strength lies in the background of the current Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, who took office in June 2023. Previously, he was head of the Turkish Intelligence Service (MIT) from 2010 to 2023, where he gained considerable experience and valuable information.
Turkey's geographical location also played into its hands. It borders both warring nations via the Black Sea and is therefore in the immediate vicinity of the conflict. Turkey has also kept its airspace open to Russia, which simplifies the logistics of diplomatic negotiations. As the official guardian of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, Turkey naturally occupies a strategic position that strengthens its role as a potential mediator in matters concerning the Black Sea, and we have seen extensive evidence regarding the importance of the Black Sea since the Russian invasion against Ukraine started.)
Ankara seems genuinely interested in a swift settlement of the war, as both Russia and Ukraine are its important partners. Turkey is also keen to avoid an escalation of tensions between the West and Russia. In such a situation, Ankara would be forced to abandon its balancing foreign policy and clearly take sides. This would not only limit its room for maneuver in every respect but could also lead to Turkey finding itself in an unfavorable position as a buffer or frontline state.
Turkey has already achieved several diplomatic successes during the Russia-Ukraine war. After the invasion began in February 2022, Turkey hosted important meetings, including one on March 10 in Antalya with the foreign ministers of Turkey, Russia and Ukraine, followed by ceasefire talks in Istanbul on March 29, attended by Ukrainian and Russian officials. The process, which had previously begun in Belarus, resulted in a draft agreement that was recently published by The New York Times.
This was followed in July 2022 by the Black Sea Grain Initiative, the signing ceremony of which took place at the Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul. (Although the Ukrainian and Russian sides refused to sign a joint document, they signed separate but identical agreements with Turkey and the United Nations.) In September of the same year, Ankara also played a role in facilitating a Russian-Ukrainian prisoner exchange involving 270 people.
The grain deal expired on July 17, 2023, and the Russian side refused to extend it. Vladimir Putin had already announced Russia's intention to withdraw from the agreement in October 2022. However, according to Turkish reports, at that time Erdogan managed to convince his Russian counterpart to remain in the deal during four days of telephone negotiations – a diplomatic achievement that the Turkish president considered a personal success.
In March 2024, a new agreement was almost reached to ensure the safety of merchant shipping in the Black Sea. Reuters reported that agreement had been reached on a text that Erdogan had planned to announce the day before Turkey's local elections, but Ukraine pulled out of the deal at the last minute.
One of the most important questions is whether the parties really trust Turkey as a mediator. Since the outbreak of the war, Ankara has repeatedly emphasized its impartiality (in Turkish: tarafsizlik). However, trust — especially from the Russian side — remains questionable. For Moscow, Turkey is seen first and foremost as a NATO member, regardless of how pragmatic relations between Russia and Turkey are. In addition, Ankara, despite asserting its neutrality, has supported Ukraine militarily.
The case of the Azov commanders further strained Russia's trust in Turkey. On July 8, 2023, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky returned from Turkey with five commanders of the Azov regiment. These Ukrainian soldiers had been captured by the Russian armed forces in May 2022. Following a Russian-Ukrainian agreement, they were released to Turkey in September as part of a prisoner exchange on the condition that they remain there until the end of the war.
From Russian point of view, Ankara seriously violated the agreement by allowing their return. Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov suggested that Turkey’s decision was influenced by growing pressure from its NATO allies, particularly in the run-up to the NATO summit in Vilnius. If this interpretation is correct, it raises a critical question: if Ankara has given in to external pressure once, what assurance is there that it will not do so again in the future?
When asked in July whether Erdogan could mediate in the negotiations between Russian and Ukraine, Peskov replied, "that is not possible". Andrei Kolesnikov, a journalist for the Russian daily Kommersant, noted that many seem to forget about Turkey's release of the Azov commanders, whom Moscow has labeled members of a terrorist organization. Kolesnikov believes that this incident is the reason why Putin’s visit to Turkey has since been postponed.
From the point of view of the parties involved, the conflict is not yet ripe for mediation. Despite Turkey’s efforts, it is unlikely that Ankara alone can bring about an end to the war. Moreover, Turkey is not the only potential mediator. For example, the United Arab Emirates has facilitated five Russian-Ukrainian prisoner exchanges this year alone, as well as a Russian-American exchange in December 2022. Should Russia express its desire to end the war and seek a mediator, major powers or traditional mediators — such as Switzerland or international organizations — would likely be happy to take on this role. However, Turkey can continue to play an important role on more specific issues such as the prisoner exchange or the grain deal.
To some extent, Ankara is also contributing to the noise in the information space surrounding the war. The Turkish leadership constantly emphasizes its importance as a mediator and presents itself as the best and most natural choice. Who knows — if this narrative is repeated often enough, it might eventually work.
In the meantime, Turkey is already benefiting from its mediation efforts. In addition to strengthening its global political standing, one of the most important benefits for Ankara is that it can show its Western partners that its neutral approach and continued engagement with both sides also serves their interests. This could help Turkey avert punitive measures, because it has not joined the majority of Western sanctions against Russia.
But precisely because Turkey is so obviously willing to mediate, why should Moscow give it a major diplomatic victory without anything in return? Just as we have no insight into the ceasefire negotiations behind the scenes, we also know nothing about other potential agreements taking place behind closed doors.
Turkey and Russia have a number of common interests: while Turkey continues its mediation efforts, Moscow is currently mediating between Turkey and Syria. Furthermore, Russian oil products, relabeled as Turkish, are being shipped to the European Union (e.g. to Greece and Spain) via Turkish ports, thus circumventing the sanctions through a legal loophole.
Nikolett Pénzváltó, PhD, is a Turkey expert and a security policy analyst. Currently, she has been working as a researcher at the Budapest based John Lukacs Institute for Strategy and Politics.
This article was written in the framework of The Eastern Frontier Initiative (TEFI) project. TEFI is a collaboration of independent publishers from Central and Eastern Europe, to foster common thinking and cooperation on European security issues in the region. The project aims to promote knowledge sharing in the European press and contribute to a more resilient European democracy.
Members of the consortium are 444 (Hungary), Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland), SME (Slovakia), PressOne (Romania), and Bellingcat (The Netherlands).
The TEFI project is co-financed by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor EACEA can be held responsible for them.
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