The first presidential debate between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump took place on 17 September, and although the consensus is that Harris won the debate, this is unlikely to unsettle Trump's voter base. It seems that for the whole world, the outcome of these elections will be more important than ever before. On the one hand, the conflict in Gaza is threatening to result in a regional war. On the other hand, the Russo-Ukrainian war will enter its fourth year as the new presidential administration takes office. Assuming, of course, that peace will not come unexpectedly by then, which, let's face it, is highly unlikely.
Nevertheless, the Hungarian government seems to have high hopes that Donald Trump will be elected and that he will bring peace to Ukraine one way or another. So much so that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has already warned in his speech in Baile Tusnad that Europe could fall behind on peace and that, if Trump wins, Europe will have to switch to a peace policy, admit defeat, face shame and take its political responsibility alone. Trump ante portas, Viktor Orbán warned. But before we miss the ‘runaway peace express’, it's worth examining how the Russians themselves see the stakes of the US presidential elections.
Ever since Richard Nixon's presidency and the softening of US-Russia relations, there has been a myth among the Russian political elite that it is easier to find common ground with the Republican Party. While the Republicans were seen as the manifestation of the materialistic, business-focused side of America, with whom it was possible to negotiate on pragmatic grounds, the Democrats were seen as hard to reach in the eyes of the Soviets because of their idealistic approach.
Since the end of the Cold War, this thesis has been difficult to justify. Under the Presidency of Bill Clinton, US-Russian relations were at their friendliest, despite Clinton being a Democrat. Whereas, despite a promising start, under the Republican George W. Bush the parties were at loggerheads over the Iraq war, the deployment of US ballistic missile defence systems in Europe and the US-backed 'colour revolutions' in the post-Soviet region. In addition, it was Bush who pressed the issue of Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO accession so much so that they were promised membership in the foreseeable future.
Despite all this, Putin reportedly preferred to negotiate with President Bush rather than his Democratic successor, Barack Obama. Although Obama began his presidency by rebuilding relations after Russia's military aggression against Georgia in 2008, the mass protests that erupted over Russia's rigged parliamentary elections in 2011 and the Kremlin's perceived US role in them quickly undermined the results achieved until then. The US-Russia relationship was plunged into the deepest crisis by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in eastern Ukraine.
In 2011, Putin personally accused then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of interfering in Russia's internal affairs and inciting mass protests. Therefore, it was not surprising that when the Democratic Party nominated her for the 2016 presidential elections, Moscow, through less than legitimate means, backed Donald Trump instead, who openly praised Putin. But it is precisely because of the latter that Russia has become a domestic political factor in the United States to an extent not seen since the 1950s, which has significantly reduced Trump's room for manoeuvre in shaping relations with Russia.
The 2020 presidential elections were therefore already seen in Moscow to be without high stakes: there was little chance of improving relations and there was nowhere to sink further from the hollow point. However, at least Biden and his team were well known to the Russians, and the return of professionalism and predictability to foreign policy was a positive development in itself. Moreover, while there was no substance behind Trump's rhetoric because of the perceived too close relationship with Russia, Biden, while not liking Putin, had the broad domestic political support to negotiate with him.
These were the words of Donald Trump as he outlined during the presidential debate how he would resolve the Russo-Ukrainian war as president-elect before he was even sworn in. Putin previously said that he took Trump's statements seriously and had no doubt that his intentions to make peace were sincere. Trump’s concrete proposals are unknown, while the key question is obviously how he envisages this peacemaking process. Well, as the above-quoted half-sentence illustrates, we are no closer to deciphering this even after the first debate. Therefore, since we cannot know from Trump himself how he would bring peace to Ukraine - in just one day, as he promised - Russian experts (also) rely on the statements of Trump's foreign affairs team.
The most important document in this regard is the analysis of Trump's former National Security Adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, and Fred Fleitz, a former CIA analyst who headed the National Security Council during the Trump administration, so the writing is likely to coincide with Trump's views. Based on this article, a Trump presidency would make future military assistance to Ukraine conditional upon Kiev's willingness to negotiate with Moscow, while it would punish the Kremlin's refusal to negotiate by radically increasing this military assistance.
Neither of these scenarios seem plausible according to Vladimir Frolov, a foreign policy expert known for his nuanced analysis and knowledge of US foreign policy (his expertise is not surprising, given his former diplomatic cover as a Russian foreign intelligence officer in Washington). Frolov is not only sceptical about how much room for manoeuvre Trump will have in forcing the parties to negotiate, but also about the extent to which the compromises outlined by Kellogg and Fleitz are acceptable to Moscow. Indeed, the Kremlin has a clear vision for future negotiations, which according to Frolov could simply be called ‘Istanbul plus’, since Putin does not believe that it is necessary to start the diplomatic process with a clean slate. Putin argues that as the parties have already almost reached an agreement in Istanbul in March and April 2022, any negotiations should be based on the results achieved there. At that time, according to the draft texts that have been published, the Kiev leadership was willing to renounce NATO membership, commit to permanent neutrality and cease all defence cooperation with the West, provided that credible security guarantees were in place. While at that time territorial issues were secondary to the political demands of the Kremlin, a future negotiation ‘must be based on the realities of today's situation’, which is obviously a reference from Putin to the recognition of Russian sovereignty over the occupied territories.
Although territorial issues are unlikely to be of much concern for Trump, Frolov believes it is unlikely that Washington will recognise Russian territorial acquisitions after 2022, and thus sanctions will certainly remain in place. He considers it even less realistic to concede to Russia on political demands, since from the outset it has been the question of Ukraine's sovereignty that would define victory or defeat in this war. Republican foreign policy strategists consider the protection of Ukraine's core territory as a victory for the United States. This can be secured either through the expansion and institutionalisation of US military support (the Israel-model), through a bilateral security agreement similar to the South Korean or Japanese models, or through rapid NATO accession, none of which is acceptable to Moscow.
In addition, 70% of Trump supporters consider a victory in Ukraine important, a higher percentage than Republicans not supporting Trump (64%), Frolov points out. The main lesson of the poll he cites is that Trump's voter base does not want the United States to retreat and isolate itself, but wants a president who will restore America's strength and leadership in the world. This is hardly compatible with abandoning American interests for Moscow. Andrey Sushentsov, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, which can hardly be accused of Western bias, and Dean of the Moscow Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), shares this view. Sushentsov believes that America has invested too much 'resources, attention, energy and symbolic capital' in Ukraine to just let it go. For this reason, he considers it almost impossible that Trump would be willing to make decisive concessions to Russia.
This is also clear from Trump's statements, who, while saying little about peacemaking, says more about how Moscow would never have dared to attack Ukraine if he were President. He claims that this conviction was confirmed by Viktor Orbán, or at least he made an example of him during the presidential debate, elevating the Hungarian Prime Minister to a domestic factor in American politics. Russian foreign policy experts do not seem to share his view (or Orbán’s).
According to Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, a think-tank of the Russian foreign ministry, Trump's Russia policy would not have differed much from Biden's at the end of 2021, nor would his reaction to the outbreak of the war, therefore the 'sanctions tsunami' would have hit Russia regardless of who was in the Oval Office. Just as he does not think that Trump would have pursued a radically different policy before the war, Timofeev does not expect Trump to bring any change in US-Russia relations either. In fact, he argues that the stakes of the US presidential elections are of secondary, or rather tertiary, importance for Russia. Moreover, what we learned from the experience of his 2016-2020 presidency is that Trump actively opposes arms limitation agreements and during his term tried to force Russian gas out of Europe by imposing sanctions on companies involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2. A new Trump presidency would certainly be even more assertive in trying to increase the share of US hydrocarbons in the European market, according to Timofeev, which could be a warning sign for the Hungarian government. All the more so as Trump pointed out during the presidential debate that he was the one who prevented the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and that it was Biden's fault that it was finally completed.
Russian foreign policy analysts focusing on the United States warned already during the 2016 elections that it would be a mistake to have high expectations of Donald Trump. Even if there were illusions at certain levels of the Russian political leadership about what Trump's election could bring, they have probably been completely dispelled by now. Russia’s conflict with the West is seen by these analysts as structural and enduring which will not be solved with the end of the war in Ukraine. This is the view of Sergei Karaganov, the most hawkish of foreign policy experts active in public. Compared to him Putin gives the impression of a calm and sober national leader, while Karaganov is tenaciously trying to convince the Russian President of the desirability of embarking on the path of nuclear escalation.
According to Karaganov, a change in US foreign policy behaviour can only come if America is ready to leave its role as a global leader behind and become a regular great power. (This is a rather ironic statement in the light of Russia's ongoing imperialist war aimed at forcing its neighbour back into its sphere of interest). Nevertheless, Karaganov believes that this is a long-term process, which cannot be influenced from the outside, and which presupposes a complete generational and elite change. As conspicuous as he may seem, Trump is part of this elite, and although he belongs to the more realistic half, his hands are tied, Karaganov argues.
In light of all this, it is safe to say that there is no clear preference for Moscow regarding the outcome of this year’s elections in the USA. Putin's earlier statement that he preferred Biden to Trump because the former was more experienced and predictable, was interpreted by many as the Russian President actually wanting Trump in the White House and therefore trying to reduce the incumbent's re-election chances by giving him unsolicited support.
In reality, however, it is entirely possible that Putin was being sincere. As Karaganov points out, the billions of dollars given by the Americans to Ukraine may seem like a lot, but they are in fact pocket money in exchange for bleeding Russia dry. From Moscow's point of view, the problem is that Washington can achieve the strategic weakening of Russia without risk and relatively cheaply. It is not by chance that Karaganov claims repeatedly that the war will not end until it creates a substantial cost for the West (or until they are shocked by a demonstrative nuclear strike).
On the other hand, this also means predictability. The Russian propaganda mantra that the West will fight to the last Ukrainian also means that the Kremlin should not fear that Washington will risk openly intervening in the conflict. Although this might be a painful situation for Moscow, Putin sees time as working in his favour and thinks that Ukraine will break before the Russian manpower and military arsenal runs out. If Harris, who has no foreign policy experience, is elected, US foreign policy will be run by the Democratic ‘deep state’ and the tried and tested personnel of the Biden and Obama administrations, according to Dmitry Suslov, Deputy Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at HSE University, Moscow.
While both Harris and Trump are interested in ending the war, according to Suslov, the latter wants to do so as quickly as possible, so that he can then focus resources and attention on China, which also carries a higher risk. Suslov argues that it is not worth expecting Trump to reach an agreement that would be even minimally acceptable to Russia. At the same time, Trump's unpredictability may lead him to try to force Moscow to compromise, which increases the risk of escalation. However, there is one factor in Trump's favour. Namely, that his election could weaken the relationship between Washington and its allies, while a Harris presidency could bring consolidation in this regard. Fyodor Lukyanov, Research Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, also sees this as a potential positive outcome of a Trump presidency, which he believes could accelerate Europe's shift to the right.
So what is the Russian interest in the US presidential elections? To achieve the closest possible, and preferably disputed, result, and thereby increase domestic instability in the US. Andrey Sushentsov says this openly, arguing that if the question of fairness emerges regarding the results of the elections, it could undermine confidence in the United States, even on the part of their allies. Recently, the US Department of Justice imposed sanctions on Margarita Simonyan, the editor-in-chief of RT (formerly called Russia Today), and eight other employees of the channel for their central role in malign Russian influence efforts. Simonyan's subsequent outright admission of what she has done for the sake of the Russian government is probably not just boasting for her own sake. It is rather part of an operation designed not so much to help Trump get elected, but rather to imply that his victory was achieved by Moscow's influence. This could undermine confidence in the US political system.
This article was written in the framework of The Eastern Frontier Initiative (TEFI) project. TEFI is a collaboration of independent publishers from Central and Eastern Europe, to foster common thinking and cooperation on European security issues in the region. The project aims to promote knowledge sharing in the European press and contribute to a more resilient European democracy.
Members of the consortium are 444 (Hungary), Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland), SME (Slovakia), PressOne (Romania), and Bellingcat (The Netherlands).
The TEFI project is co-financed by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor EACEA can be held responsible for them.
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