Former Pentagon expert on Russia: Ukrainians should corrupt Trump. I know it sounds terrible

NATO’s new Secretary-General, Mark Rutte, has been called the "Trump Whisperer".

I hope we won’t reach a point where "whispering" is needed, but if it comes to that, those of us who understand why we need the Alliance will also try to sway Trump.

Could his unpredictability also be a challenge for Putin?

Perhaps, but so far Trump has been unpredictable mainly for America’s allies and China, not for Putin. Let’s not forget that if reelected, Trump will be nearing 80. We don’t know how that might affect his decision-making.

Could this give the vice president a larger role?

Oh, J.D. Vance is certainly not unpredictable. He simply wants to end American support for Ukraine.

So Putin is rooting for Trump and Vance?

Of course. It’s exactly what he wants. All his recent political and diplomatic moves indicate he’s waiting for Trump’s return to the White House. This isn’t just another election. We haven’t seen this level of isolationism, populism, and protectionism in the U.S. in decades – probably not since the interwar period. It’s really reminiscent of the 1930s.

Trump says he’d end the war in Ukraine in a day. Clearly unrealistic, unless the U.S. fully commits to one side or the other. I fear that, in practice, he’d give Putin a free hand.

Even among Trump’s advisors, there are different ideas on Ukraine policy. Apparently, Ukrainians are already making connections with both the Harris and Trump teams. How could they persuade him to maintain support?

To be blunt, I think Trump is corrupt. If it were up to me, I’d try to exploit that by offering something he’d perceive as beneficial to himself or his family. I know that sounds terrible.

Just to be clear, I wouldn’t want that. For years, we’ve worked to reduce corruption in Ukraine.

Earlier this year, you said the West should keep Putin guessing, keep him off balance…

I stand by that.

Since then, Ukrainians have launched a surprise offensive in the Kursk region. Yet the Biden administration still doesn’t allow them to strike Russian targets with long-range missiles. Why is that? A few weeks ago, media leaks suggested they were close to approving it.

Honestly, I don’t know. Maybe there are valid concerns about escalation, something our intelligence services picked up. There are also arguments about the limited supply of long-range missiles and the need to use them strategically. But I don’t find that convincing because there are targets in Russia that could be hit once to achieve a strategic outcome.

But the most likely reason seems to be that Biden’s team doesn’t want to do anything that might hurt Kamala Harris’s chances in the election. If Russia reacted unpredictably, people might look more critically at Biden’s foreign policy, including in Ukraine.

So, after the election, the chances of a green light increase?

That’s my sense. Though, as I said, it could also be held back by a specific danger or threat from Russia.

A direct warning?

Or something picked up by our intelligence.

Journalist Bob Woodward writes in his latest book War that, at one point, Biden’s team assessed a 50% chance of Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

In general, I think Putin’s nuclear threats are given too much weight. But there are concerns about potential sabotage of nuclear plants in Ukraine, for example. Or it could be something else entirely – we don’t know.

Do you think Biden might want to leave a final, bold mark on history during the period between the election and the transfer of power in January, making some decisive moves in the war, or would he simply wait it out?

Hmm, interesting question. I would expect that if Kamala Harris wins, Biden will act only in coordination with her team, to make things easier for her. If both teams agree it would benefit the U.S., he might authorize strikes on targets deep within Russia using Western weapons.

However, if Trump wins, I think Biden will definitely look for ways to solidify his foreign policy legacy – perhaps by deploying long-range missiles or providing some form of game-changing aid, or even moving forward with steps to bring Ukraine into NATO.

Biden discussed Ukraine in Berlin with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Was it a mistake not to invite Poland?

I would have invited Poland to ensure it wasn’t just a Western European perspective being represented. Poland’s significance has grown, but there’s still work to be done. It’s hard to say what specifically led to the decision in this case.

What can Ukraine realistically expect if Harris wins? Continuation of Biden’s policy – that much is clear, to a certain degree. But what might change?

I think Kamala Harris would re-evaluate the policy and consider ways to support Ukraine more effectively. I just don’t know how willing she would be to take risks. I’m very curious about that.

Domestically, she was a tough prosecutor. She says she understands the mindset of foreign "thugs" she’ll face, which, in many ways, mirrors the organized crime bosses she used to go after. So she might even be tougher than Biden. She’ll want to end the conflict and may consider options previously ruled out.

Woodward’s sources say that Biden was critical of Obama’s policy on Russia during the 2014 annexation of Crimea. He supposedly said, "They screwed it up. Barack never took Putin seriously". Did you feel the same?

If that’s an exact quote, it oversimplifies things. Yes, Obama and many in his administration underestimated how dangerous Putin could be, even after the war began in 2014. They didn’t fully grasp the need to deter him. I agree we didn’t do enough – and still aren’t doing enough.

When I worked in the Pentagon, those of us focused on Russia understood the importance of prioritizing it as the greatest national security challenge, beyond the Middle East or China. Unfortunately, that mindset was lacking in broader government circles. I must say, however, that then-Vice President Biden understood it well.

*Evelyn Farkas – national security and international policy analyst, current executive director of the McCain Institute, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia (2012-15, under the Obama administration), and frequent commentator in U.S. media.

Translation: Patrycja Eiduka