General Piotr Błazeusz, Eurocorps Commander: I wouldn’t frame it as fear. It’s about preparing for Russia and Putin’s next move. History and current events show us that Russia isn’t going to change its behavior.
Yes. But we should do everything possible to deter Russia.
We need to keep investing in defense, so that Russia calculates a future attack or war is not worth the cost and is unlikely to succeed.
That’s why we must do everything we can to continue supporting Ukraine. In my view, halting the war in Ukraine through a ceasefire or even a peace deal won’t protect us from the Russian threat. It won’t bring peace to Europe. In fact, it’s the opposite. It will give Russia time to rebuild its military strength, so in three or five years, they’re ready to attack again.
That’s our challenge. Of course, we’d all prefer to resolve this conflict peacefully and spend money on education, healthcare, or sports rather than the military. But given our proximity to Russia, we don’t have that luxury.
We need to keep strengthening our armed forces, modernizing, and preparing for potential threats.
I think eventually it will happen, and there will be an agreement on it. We’ve already crossed several "red lines" we initially set at the start of the war. At first, we said we wouldn’t supply tanks, then F-16s, and Patriot systems, but the reality of war has changed that. Russia’s actions will likely push NATO countries to allow this as well.
As military strategists, we consider it natural that in a war, you try to take the fight to enemy territory. Unlike Putin, Ukraine has been careful and precise, targeting only Russian military sites.
The hardest part is synchronizing all the current processes: acquiring advanced military equipment, ensuring it has a full lifecycle, and fully utilizing the new weaponry we’re acquiring, like the F-35s. This requires sweeping changes across the entire Polish army.
Another challenge is using and analyzing data effectively and engaging in experimentation.
To determine if the proposed changes have a chance of success and to ultimately enhance the combat effectiveness of our armed forces, we need to experiment. This also means there’s a risk of failure.
Poland faces a major task in expanding its defense systems, especially by building societal resilience to crises. The Russian threat isn’t only military; it requires a comprehensive model for the responsible functioning of the entire state, including society.
This involves setting appropriate legal frameworks for emergencies, preparing the state to operate during crises or wartime, and organizing the functioning of stores, banking systems, and phone networks.
We’re discussing issues that go far beyond just the military. It’s crucial for society to continue supporting these changes.
Surveys are important, but they’re not everything. Building up the military also involves demographic issues, and here, we’re struggling.
That’s why we’re exploring to what extent we can rely on unmanned systems, autonomous technologies, artificial intelligence, and other technologies to compensate for a potential lack of soldiers in the coming three, four, or five years.
It’s a challenge. But having a huge budget doesn’t necessarily mean we’ll quickly acquire the needed military systems.
The war in Ukraine has created massive demand for weapons. Buying them isn’t just about funding; it also requires production time. The queue of countries wanting to purchase arms keeps getting longer, and setting up new production lines takes years.
That should be our priority. There’s still a lot to be done on this front.
Having our own ammunition factories is essential to ensuring our security.
Every country should have the right to choose the alliance it wants to join. It seems Ukraine has already made its choice. Like Poland before, it wants to align with the West.
Right now, President Zelensky is extending an olive branch, saying, "Let’s sit down at the table. It’ll be tough, but let’s start negotiating". Russia’s response is "absolutely not", hoping they’ll still secure a victory.
It’s hard to say how long the war will last. No one knows right now. And as usual, Russia is making nuclear threats. Have we, as the West, done anything about it beyond a few statements?
We should create dilemmas for the other side and not be as fearful as we are now. There are significant concerns about certain NATO decisions and the alliance itself, but it’s about showing Russia that we have power, too.
They continue to escalate and provoke, yet we often don’t respond at all.
We shouldn’t be intimidated by Russian rhetoric; we need to demonstrate our ability to respond appropriately, including militarily. Naturally, this requires decisions within NATO.
The accession of Sweden and Finland to the Alliance has changed the strategic landscape in any potential confrontation with Russia. Certain areas that Russians once considered safe are now within NATO’s reach. Sweden and Finland joining NATO is a consequence of Putin’s actions. Once they saw that Russia was willing to use force to change the world order, they became genuinely concerned. They realized that if Putin succeeds in Ukraine, they could be next. Without NATO membership, the Alliance wouldn’t be obligated to help them.
NATO includes diverse nations, but it remains a democratic alliance, and there isn’t a better one. I’m confident that if a war broke out, our allies would come to our aid; we wouldn’t be alone.
No war is ever exactly like the last, but military experts are closely observing how Ukraine’s defense system functions, how military operations are conducted, and how attacks are carried out on Russian territory.
We’re seeing Western military equipment perform in real combat, rather than just in training exercises.
Russia marketed it as invincible, but the war in Ukraine has exposed its limitations on the frontlines. For instance, Russia has yet to deploy its latest T-14 tank.
Russia fears losing it in combat. It might turn out that their systems aren’t as impressive as claimed, which could hurt sales. If these weapons fail to meet expectations, certain contracts could fall through.
The use of aerial, land, and naval drones has completely changed the battlefield, not only in Ukraine but also in the Black Sea.
Ukraine doesn’t have a navy, yet through missile systems and drones, it has forced Russian vessels to retreat hundreds of miles from the Ukrainian coast because they’re within range. Similarly, Ukrainian drones and missiles can reach Russian ports, proving that a massive navy isn’t always needed to counter an enemy fleet.
Absolutely – that’s one clear lesson from the war in Ukraine. Using semi-autonomous combat systems has shown that it’s a cheaper but equally effective solution. Instead of launching an expensive missile, we can achieve similar results with less costly, often commercial drones adapted for military purposes.
The Kursk counteroffensive has exposed the weaknesses within the entire Russian administration, which had assured everyone that they had well-prepared plans and were ready to respond to any Ukrainian attempt to penetrate Russia. Kursk is symbolic; it’s where the tide of World War II turned.
In July 1943, the Soviets seized the initiative, and within two years, they were in Berlin. Now, Kursk signifies that the "red line" of attacking Russia on its own territory has, for the first time in this war, been crossed by Ukraine. The world held its breath, waiting to see Putin’s response, fearing what it might be. Yet Russia didn’t even mention a nuclear response.
I’m convinced the Ukrainian side is already planning something similar, likely with more cross-border incursions into Russian territory.
They are constantly deploying their drone army to strike military targets inside Russia, even attacking sites thousands of kilometers from the border – and doing so effectively. Meanwhile, the Russians are forced to pour more resources into securing their critical infrastructure, airfields, and aircraft.
Ukraine has shown that its forces are capable of striking back against an overwhelmingly larger aggressor. This unexpected and unprecedented Ukrainian strike deep within Russia, in the Kursk region, is, I would say, phenomenal.
The real question is whether they will actually be able to recruit enough people and supply enough equipment, or if this will be an army only on paper. Most experienced conscripts have already been deployed to the war, and there aren’t many left. Add to that Russia’s massive military administration, which only means more posts and costs.
Europe is our shared home. If we don’t all understand this, our security will always be at risk. We all need to combine our efforts to the maximum if we want to defend Europe. And that means ramping up militarization and dedicating greater resources to defense. There’s no other choice if we want to ensure safety for ourselves and our children.
When it comes to the military, we shouldn’t be talking about European autonomy. Instead, we should aim for harmony with democratic military organizations worldwide, especially NATO and the United States. The U.S. is a powerhouse in the defense industry, after all.
Europe won’t be able to create significant, separate military forces dedicated solely to the EU in the short term. That’s where Eurocorps comes in – a force ready to serve NATO or the EU on short notice. NATO is prepared, with experience; meanwhile, the EU is gradually developing military procedures for crises or war.
Complementarity between NATO and the EU is a challenging but achievable goal.
Globalization means that many products we label as "national" aren’t entirely so. Key subsystems, like transmissions, engines, and GPS systems, are often sourced from other countries. Yes, when we sell them, we claim these are our products, but that’s not entirely accurate.
There’s no doubt in my mind that the supplier network must be built on reliability in fulfilling contracts. In peacetime, we need access to specific systems, and when a crisis or war starts, we need to maintain continuous supply chains.
Ideally, suppliers for a European army would be from our own continent. However, with the globalization of the economy and defense industry, that’s simply not feasible. That’s why ensuring a secure supply chain from diverse sources is so crucial.
It's a multinational command, designed to carry out operational tasks for the European Union and NATO.
In 2020, Eurocorps led the NATO Rapid Response Force’s land component, and we also served as a field headquarters for the European Union.
This year, Eurocorps acts as NATO's Joint Task Force Command, assigned to crisis-response operations within the Alliance. Eurocorps has also led missions for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, has operated in Kosovo, and has been involved in EU training missions in Mali and the Central African Republic.
Yes, we’re on standby to be deployed by NATO or the EU at a moment’s notice, depending on developments and needs. We’re currently ready to take on tasks for NATO. In late 2023, Eurocorps received certification to command operations outside NATO’s Article 5, and we’re now preparing to serve as an advanced command within the EU Battlegroup.
Essentially, our work involves crisis-response military operations, but also operations designed to secure peace and civilian safety in our designated regions. Our mission is to ensure that any political agreements ending conflicts are upheld, preventing any resurgence of tensions or fighting.
Eurocorps has its own support brigade and communications system, so we’re mobile and have secured command posts. In a way, we’re self-sufficient. When a specific mission begins, units and divisions are assigned to us for command.
It’s possible that if a peace agreement is reached in Ukraine, we might be tasked with leading a peacekeeping mission or a training mission, for instance. That’s one option.
Eurocorps was founded in 1992 by Germany and France, and decisions on its deployment are made by its six "framework nations"—Poland, Belgium, France, Spain, Luxembourg, and Germany. Poland, an associate since 2002, became a framework nation in 2022. Associate nations currently include Austria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Italy. Framework nations have voting rights and decide on Eurocorps’ direction, while associate members can share their opinions and suggestions.
Yes, the command rotates every two years. Next year, after Poland, Spain will take on the leadership.
That’s natural in any international organization. Our processes take time, but consensus is reached. Framework nations, for example, decide whether Eurocorps will participate in a European or multinational mission in Ukraine or elsewhere. They also decide on mission funding. This makes our involvement in Eurocorps and our command role especially important.
It’s a huge honor. We have a voice in decisions about development, structural changes, and engagement in exercises and operations within NATO and the EU.
I can influence how the command operates, what we engage in, and the areas we develop. It’s a major role and a great opportunity to promote Poland and our armed forces. Other countries see that our officers are well-prepared. Our contingent in Eurocorps has over 120 officers and non-commissioned officers.
We’re praised for our reliability, knowledge, skills, and experience. Our Armed Forces have transformed, so we adapted smoothly to Eurocorps operations and command. We’re implementing new solutions to match changing geopolitical dynamics. As a frontline state, we’re seeing a shift in attitude from our allies and partners.
As the commander of Eurocorps, I aim to enhance our readiness for the new challenges and responsibilities that today’s military faces. Actions focused on increasing the safety of nations and their citizens are constantly evolving, requiring continuous adaptation to emerging threats from potential aggressors. This is especially true in the field of communications, where advancements are happening at a tremendous pace. Ukraine serves as an excellent example, where each month brings a pressing need to improve and upgrade this area.
I aim to ensure that Eurocorps’ role is fully recognized in NATO and EU operational plans. Rapid troop movement is crucial, so that after major military operations, Eurocorps can quickly carry out peacekeeping and civilian protection missions.
Each country perceives threats differently, naturally. The further from the front, the less immediate the threat feels. Polish society understands the threats from Russia and Belarus and supports significant spending on national defense. In countries farther from Ukraine, it’s a bit different.
Because of our history and location, the further you are from Russia, the fewer cases of sabotage, espionage, or subversion you encounter, compared to, say, Poland. Western European societies don’t feel these issues as acutely. Meanwhile, Russians still come to Western Europe and spread their narrative about the Ukraine war through disinformation.
However, in key NATO documents, like the Washington summit declaration, Russia is identified as a direct and long-term threat to the Alliance. The EU’s official "Strategic Compass" document also describes Russia as a threat.
Yes, the EU aims to become a security guarantor for its citizens and must be able to defend them. For many years, we warned Europe that Russia had imperial ambitions and wanted to shift the balance of power and disrupt the international legal order.
People looked at us skeptically, often calling us Russophobes. Unfortunately, our predictions were correct.
Back in 2007, at the Munich conference, Putin signaled his plans, but the entire West overlooked it. Even then, we said he intended to reshape the world by force. Our Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, reiterated this at the UN, pointing out the West’s short memory and tendency to miss connections. Listening to Poland could have made a difference.
Translation: Patrycja Eiduka
This article was written in the framework of The Eastern Frontier Initiative (TEFI) project. TEFI is a collaboration of independent publishers from Central and Eastern Europe, to foster common thinking and cooperation on European security issues in the region. The project aims to promote knowledge sharing in the European press and contribute to a more resilient European democracy.
Members of the consortium are 444 (Hungary), Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland), SME (Slovakia), PressOne (Romania), and Bellingcat (The Netherlands).
The TEFI project is co-financed by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor EACEA can be held responsible for them.
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