Between late October and early November, Moldova and Georgia, two post-Soviet nations aspiring to join the European Union (EU), held elections that many observers considered to have significant geopolitical stakes. On one hand, West-leaning politicians centered their electoral campaigns on whether these countries would maintain their momentum toward European integration or be swayed by Russian interests. On the other the issue of Russian interference is much more complex than usually described in the media. The alleged "pro-Russian" factions officially supported the European path, but emphasized the importance of maintaining pragmatic relations with Moscow, citing the threat of aggression. Although the elections yielded diverging results, they both exhibited accusations of ballot stuffing, multiple voting, and other irregularities. While much of the attention has been on the Kremlin's organized interference to maintain its grip on both countries, such perspective does not capture the full picture. These elections highlighted how, regardless of their geopolitical aspirations, Georgia and Moldova face deeper structural challenges that complicate their European path.
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has reignited concerns about an impending security threat for Georgia and Moldova. These two post-Soviet nations have long sought to distance themselves from Moscow's influence while pursuing membership in the European Union (EU), and in the case of Georgia, also in NATO. Their efforts have so far culminated in official EU candidate status being granted to Chisinau in June 2022 and Tbilisi in December 2023.
For Georgians, what is happening in Ukraine evokes painful memories of the war their country fought against Russia in 2008. Surveys have consistently shown that a significant majority of Georgians view the Kremlin as their country's primary threat and support a foreign policy aimed at forging closer ties with Euro-Atlantic structures. In Moldova, heightened anxiety has prevailed due to the battlefield's proximity, particularly as Russian forces have captured significant territories in southern Ukraine, including parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions.
Both countries have contended with the presence of Russian military forces in their territory since gaining independence. Abkhazia and South Ossetia have maintained de facto sovereignty since the conflicts with Georgia in the 1990s, with substantial backing from the Kremlin. Following the 2008 war, Russia officially recognized their independence and has since increased its military presence in both territories.
In a similar vein, Transnistria broke away from Moldova in 1990. To date, it remains unrecognized by the UN and any member states, including Russia. However, Russian peacekeeping troops are stationed in this region to enforce a 1992 ceasefire agreement between Moscow and Chisinau. According to polls conducted at the beginning of the year, public opinion in Transnistria and Gagauzia, another region of Moldova known for its pro-Russian sentiments, continues to view the Kremlin as an essential economic and political partner.
Observers generally argue that Russia leverages its military presence in breakaway territories and its favorable reputation among local populations to undermine the legitimacy of the Georgian and Moldovan governments. This strategy enables the Kremlin to exert pressure on their economic and energy stability and, most importantly, to obstruct their Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
However, Moscow's decision to transition from merely providing military and financial support to the de facto authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk to launch a full-scale invasion in Ukraine in February 2022 has compelled Chisinau and Tbilisi to reevaluate their relationships with Moscow and their Western partners.
The Moldovan government has adopted a cautious stance regarding its economic relations with the Kremlin, choosing not to implement bilateral sanctions against Moscow. While, since the last year, Chisinau no longer purchases gas from Russia's Gazprom, this does not imply that Moldova has fully escaped Russia's influence on its energy supplies. Russian gas continues to flow into Transnistria, and a significant portion of Moldova’s electricity is still generated by the electrical plant in Transnistria, which relies on Russian gas.
Politically, however, President Maia Sandu has prioritized a pro-Western alignment, as demonstrated by her condemnation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, her crucial involvement in securing EU candidate status for Moldova, and her commitment to tackling hybrid security threats posed by Moscow.
In Georgia, the government has also condemned Russia's invasion and demonstrated its support for Ukraine by providing humanitarian aid. Georgian authorities have also backed Ukraine-related initiatives within the United Nations, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe, joining calls for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate Russian war crimes.
However, the ruling party, "Georgian Dream," in power since 2012, has implemented several antidemocratic and illiberal laws, including those targeting "foreign agents" and restricting "LGBT propaganda." Bidzina Ivanishvili, the party's founder and honorary chairman, has even threatened to ban major opposition parties.
This authoritarian shift has increasingly been considered by observers as pro-Russian. The "foreign agents" law, which entered into force at the beginning of August, closely mirrors a bill introduced by the Russian Duma in 2012 aimed at stifling civil society. While Russia is not the only country with a regulatory and transparency framework specifically targeting NGOs that receive foreign funding, many Georgians have swiftly linked this law to the Kremlin. As a result, this bill has been commonly referred to as the "Russian Law" both inside and outside the country.
Like Chisinau, Tbilisi has not pursued any bilateral sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, the appearance of large billboards along the capital's main roads in September, featuring an image of a bombed church in Ukraine alongside a photo of an intact Georgian church with the message "No to War, Choose Peace!", suggested that Georgian Dream has sought to promote itself as the only political force capable of maintaining peace with Moscow.
Finally, Bidzina Ivanishvili's background as a tycoon who amassed his wealth through business ventures in Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union added credit to this perception. His standing became even more controversial within the country when, at a September campaign rally, he blamed the onset of the 2008 war on pro-West "external forces" and the previous Georgian government, while also suggesting an apology to South Ossetia.
In the presidential elections held in Moldova on October 20, followed by a runoff on November 3, incumbent President Maia Sandu emerged victorious against her opponent, former Prosecutor General Aleksandr Stoianoglo. Although condemning Russia's actions in Ukraine, Stoianoglo received endorsements from several political parties which have historically favored friendly relations with Moscow, including the Party of Communists, the Party of Socialists, and the Common Action Party.
While Stoianoglu has advocated for neutrality and views the Kremlin as a "development partner" alongside other major players such as the EU, the United States, and China, Sandu accused him of being a "Trojan horse" for external interests seeking to exert control over Moldova.
Sandu garnered 42.5 percent of the votes in the first round, failing to achieve an outright majority. Nonetheless, she successfully secured re-election in the runoff, receiving 54.35 percent of the vote. When looking at the results within Moldova itself, Sandu narrowly lost to Stoianoglo, achieving 48.8 percent compared to his 51.2 percent. In stark contrast, she got over 80 percent of the votes from the diaspora. Sandu's weakest support came from Gagauzia, Stoianoglo's native region, as well as from Transnistria and the Bulgarian-majority district of Taraclia.
Alongside the presidential election, Moldovans participated in a referendum aimed at enshrining the country’s aspirations for EU membership in its constitution. The referendum passed narrowly, with the "yes" vote at 50.46 percent and the "no" vote at 49.54 percent. This outcome caught Sandu’s government off guard, as exit polls had predicted that the 'yes' vote would garner support between 54 percent and 65 percent.
Just a week after the first round of elections in Moldova, parliamentary elections were held in Georgia. Here, Georgian Dream party secured nearly 53.9 percent of the vote, while the four opposition parties (the "Coalition for Change", centered around the "Ahali" party, the "Unity coalition", based on the "United National Movement", the "Strong Georgia" coalition, and the "For Georgia" party) recorded collectively the 37,8 percent of the vote.
According to data from the electoral commission, the ruling party secured notable victories in most regions of the country. However, it experienced setbacks in Tbilisi and narrowly avoided losses in major cities like Kutaisi, Batumi, and Poti. The party performed particularly well in the southern regions of Samtkhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli, except for Rustavi, its largest town, where it faced defeat. These southern regions are predominantly inhabited by ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
Numerous reported violations before and during the electoral process, highlighted by both local and international observers, have raised serious questions about the legitimacy of the vote. A report released by the joint observation mission from the OSCE, ODIHR, PACE, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA), and the European Parliament noted how the election day "was marked by a tense environment. The secrecy of the vote was frequently compromised and there were reports of intimidation and pressure on voters". Consequently, the opposition has rejected the election results and chosen not to participate in the new parliament.
The issue of Russia’s interference has been a focal point in discussions surrounding both elections. In the first round of elections in Moldova, President Maria Sandu directly addressed the nation, stating, "Criminal groups, working together with foreign forces hostile to our national interests, have attacked our country with tens of millions of euros, lies and propaganda, using the most disgraceful means to keep our citizens and our nation trapped in uncertainty and instability".
The next day, Moldova's police chief, Viorel Cernauteanu, announced that Moscow had launched an unprecedented interference campaign in collaboration with Ilan Shor, a pro-Russian oligarch convicted of mass fraud in Moldova and currently residing in Moscow. According to Moldovan police, Shor used Russia's Promsvyazbank to transfer 24 million in October, in addition to another 15 million sent in September, with the aim of bribing 130,000 voters.
In Georgia, as soon as the results became official, thousands of opposition supporters gathered in Tbilisi, waving Georgian and EU flags while demanding new elections under international oversight. On October 28, Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili claimed she does not recognize the election results, calling the process a "total robbery" and asserting that the Georgian populace witnessed a "Russian special operation." However, the extent of Russian interference in Georgian elections remains unclear.
Moscow has rejected any involvement in either election. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov questioned the legitimacy of the results in Moldova, stating that that "What we are seeing is a mechanically difficult-to-explain surge in votes for Sandu and for those referendum participants who supported an EU orientation."
While Russian interference certainly played a significant role in the two countries’ elections, there is no concrete evidence that vote rigging by the Georgian Dream party or vote-buying to assist Stoianoglu could have decisively altered the results. Additionally, these practices cannot be solely attributed to Moscow's intent to interfere in the democratic processes of the two countries.
Moldova, besides being one of Europe's poorest countries, is struggling to recover from recent economic setbacks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the ramifications of the Russo-Ukrainian war. These challenges lead many voters to prioritize the preservation of economic ties with Russia and view European ambitions as secondary. Also, it is important to recognize that some segments of the population, in particular in Transnistria and Gagauzia, genuinely see Moscow as a crucial partner rather than an adversary.
Overall, while Sandu's victory is promising for those Moldovans seeking closer EU ties, the significant influence that the opposition holds in various regions suggests that the Moldovan president will encounter major challenges in the upcoming parliamentary elections next summer. The latter will be decisive for the government's future direction.
In Georgia, the ruling Georgian Dream party has successfully convinced voters in smaller towns and conservative communities outside Tbilisi that there is a "global war party" determined to drag Georgia into conflict with Russia. By suppressing NGOs and taking advantage of the opposition's lack of strong parliamentary leadership, Georgian Dream has consolidated its power and propelled the country toward a more authoritarian regime.
This shift toward authoritarianism has divided the EU bloc, with various European leaders showing support for the opposition and participating in protests in Tbilisi. In contrast, Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has publicly endorsed the current administration led by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, even visiting Tbilisi before the announcement of the official election results.
Finally, an important issue is that minority groups in Georgia tend to support the ruling party. This can be attributed to several factors, including a lack of political awareness, low engagement in public affairs, and, in some cases, unfamiliarity with the state language. So far, the opposition has failed to present convince the realities in which Georgian Dream has achieved significant success.
This article was written in the framework of The Eastern Frontier Initiative (TEFI) project. TEFI is a collaboration of independent publishers from Central and Eastern Europe, to foster common thinking and cooperation on European security issues in the region. The project aims to promote knowledge sharing in the European press and contribute to a more resilient European democracy.
Members of the consortium are 444 (Hungary), Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland), SME (Slovakia), PressOne (Romania), and Bellingcat (The Netherlands).
The TEFI project is co-financed by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor EACEA can be held responsible for them.
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