Journalist and expert on the situation at the ukrainian front: "The army is still being commanded as if it were 2022"

Butusov frequently visits the front lines and is known for his outspoken criticism of Ukraine’s military and political leadership. Late last year, he exposed serious issues – such as widespread desertions – within the 155th "Anne of Kyiv" Brigade, a unit equipped by France, with some of its soldiers having undergone training there. Throughout our conversation, his phone constantly rang with calls from soldiers and officers at the front.

Piotr Andrusieczko: What’s the current situation on the front line? Which sections are most at risk?

Yuriy Butusov: In several areas along the front, the enemy has already broken through or is on the verge of doing so. Their tactics are working in their favor – they rely on "disposable" assault infantry for attacks. These units fight until they either complete their assigned task or are completely wiped out. They scout our positions, which are then hit by artillery and drones.

Commanding Russian infantry is as simple as pointing to a spot on the map and saying, "Forward!".

Russian discipline doesn't stem from an understanding of strategic goals but is enforced through immediate executions or other forms of punishment. A commander can order his soldiers to do anything he wants. This is why training quality is not a critical factor for the Russian army.

We can see that the enemy is not only able to quickly mobilize forces but also maintain control over them and ensure combat effectiveness – all thanks to their use of coercive measures. Their infantry is sent into battle after just two weeks of training, and they achieve their objectives because they have no other option for survival. Ukraine cannot operate this way.

Russia has been conducting continuous offensive operations since October 2023. Last year, many Ukrainian experts predicted that Russian forces would be exhausted by fall, but that forecast didn’t hold.

The entire Ukrainian "miracle" of 2022 was due to the fact that a large number of Ukrainians self-mobilized and fought independently. After three years, those people are no longer there. Now, we have to rely on mobilized infantry.

Previously, our infantry handled everything on their own. It was a convenient situation for our military leadership – they could simply give orders, and people would execute them. But things have changed. The new recruits need training and organization.

A person cannot be deployed to the front line with only two weeks of training. Even after two months, they are still undertrained. At the beginning of the war, this was common, and it can still happen in isolated cases, but those situations often end in desertion. Besides, it’s now much harder from a legal standpoint because basic military training is mandatory.

Unfortunately, the army is still being commanded as if it were February 2022. As a result, we now have a significant number of mobilized soldiers who have deserted.

Military commanders now have to fulfill their duties – but they are not prepared for it. The scandals surrounding newly formed units show that leading people into battle now requires much more effort than before.

But I believe it is still possible. The skills of our people going to the front – even those who were forcibly mobilized – are significantly higher than those of the soldiers sent by Russia.

You exposed abuses within the newly created 155th "Anne of Kyiv" Brigade. Many officers had already criticized the idea of forming new brigades from scratch. They argued it would be better to reinforce and expand existing ones, where new soldiers could gain experience from veterans.

– Ukraine does not have a military doctrine that clearly defines mobilization procedures. There is no real discussion, not even among the highest military command or parliamentary committees, regarding the state of the army and the solutions it requires.

Everything depends on the Office of the President of Ukraine and literally a handful of decision-makers. This extreme centralization leaves no room for debate or alternative solutions. A few people influence the course of the war, making decisions based on templates, memories, or personal ideas of how things "should be managed".

There is no criticism of these decisions, no discussion. Our leadership is very detached from the realities of war. In fact, decision-makers rarely visit the front.

Wait, but President Zelensky frequently visits the front lines...

– In 2024, Volodymyr Zelensky has been to the front twice. Once at the beginning of the year, when he spent two hours visiting a battalion headquarters and a brigade command post near Avdiivka. The second time was in November, about 50 km from the front line. That visit lasted about an hour and a half, after which he stopped in the Kupiansk area for another hour. Each time, he came to hand out a few medals and take photos. [However, available reports indicate that Zelensky was in frontline areas or regions where fighting was taking place at least five times in 2024 – editor’s note.]

Both times, Zelensky asked what was needed at the front, and each time, the answer was the same: people and drones. And that was the end of the conversation. The truth is, Zelensky does not discuss the war with anyone except Syrskyi [Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – editor’s note]. He simply signs off on decisions he doesn’t even have the capacity to analyze.

Is that what went wrong with these newly created brigades?

– What does it take to establish new brigades? You build them from recruits who have undergone just two months of training. Then, they must learn how to function as a brigade. This takes time – a lot more than one month. Instead of fighting, these soldiers are stuck in the rear, still training.

Moreover, new brigades require a full set of weapons and military equipment. That demands organization, assistance from Western partners, and government funding for maintenance. These are massive expenses.

The dead are the price of war that society pays, but its true fuel is money. If you look closely, the biggest problem with these newly formed brigades is the enormous amount of money spent on them. And then, all that effort is wasted—because soldiers from these brigades either abandon their posts or suffer unnecessary losses at the front due to poor leadership.

In Ukraine, we often repeat the propaganda slogan that "the army should be responsible for the war". In reality, this is a false vision. As American Admiral Ernest J. King once said: "In war, amateurs study tactics, but professionals study logistics". And he was absolutely right. [In fact, while the exact origin of the quote remains uncertain, variations of this sentiment have been expressed by many military figures and authors – translator’s note].

War is a massive technological process that requires managers, service personnel, engineers, and operators. None of these people exist within the newly formed brigades. You can’t just find them on the street – they have to be trained. And that takes extra time. If the costs of forming and sustaining these new brigades were properly assessed, it would be clear that this is the wrong approach.

In Ukraine, no one counts the money. The current government is solely focused on maintaining a good public image. It’s easy to say that Zelensky isn’t responsible for anything because the military is in charge. But in reality, it’s Zelensky who has to make decisions about resource allocation. The military might say, "To win, we need 100 brigades and a thousand tanks." But that doesn’t mean they should be given exactly that – especially when there’s neither the money nor the manpower to support it.

Only the president can declare mobilization, and he is ultimately responsible for assigning those troops. That falls within his legal powers. The same applies to financial decisions.

By the way, after the scandal with the "Anne of Kyiv" Brigade, Zelensky – under public pressure – decided to ban the formation of new brigades.

But that hasn’t been officially announced yet?

– No, but it’s already being implemented.

What’s happening with the 155th Brigade now? When you first raised concerns about it, you mentioned that most of its soldiers were already fighting on the front lines.

– The leadership is attempting to transform it from a political initiative into a fully operational combat brigade, though clear, decisive actions are still missing. They’re transferring experienced officers there, though not many remain in the army. They’ve also allocated funds for drones. The 155th Brigade is still a high-profile project – Macron is watching, so we can’t just let it fall apart.

As a result, what wasn’t done properly during the brigade’s formation is now being worked out in combat conditions. Of course, this is a terrible approach that leads to heavy losses.

When the media reported on the 155th Brigade’s problems and the 50 soldiers who fled in France, they emphasized that this was a joint project – Ukraine provides the men, while its partners provide the weapons and training. It sounded like a solid plan. And yet, a total of 1,700 soldiers have left the brigade!

– But wasn’t this always a political project that just looked good on paper? It should have been carefully analyzed from the start.

First, was France actually capable of providing adequate equipment? Second, what are our real priorities – what do we need most? Third, do we even have the manpower and resources to sustain this brigade? And lastly, do we even require it in this particular structure? The budget for this new brigade was around one billion euros. France didn’t have enough equipment to supply it fully.

The weapons and gear we received weren’t new, either. We had to spend additional funds from our own budget just to make them combat-ready. As a result, together with our French allies, we poured massive sums into a brigade that is still not fully prepared for battle.

Maybe instead of asking the French for a billion euros to build a new brigade, it would have been wiser to take 200 million and use it to reinforce and train several existing ones – and invest in drones? That money would have been far more effective in killing Russians.

Instead of fixing the situation, we had to send one of our experienced battalions near Pokrovsk to hold the line with the 155th Brigade because they simply couldn’t handle it.

Speaking of resources, what is currently in shorter supply – weaponry or men? Not long ago, everyone was mainly worried about the former.

– Both. That’s always the case in war. If you read any war memoirs from the last 250 years, you’ll see that in any large-scale war, there’s never enough infantry or ammunition. Right now, we’re also still short on drones.

Still? Even after massive government orders, all the companies producing them, and the civilians constantly raising money for them?

– It all comes down to planning. Take the example of a single brigade – its budget was set at one billion euros. That’s about 45 billion hryvnias. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government allocated 55 billion hryvnias for an entire year of drone production, which covers only about 30% of the front line’s needs. Instead of pouring money into the 155th Brigade, we could have doubled our drone supply.

On January 1st, mandatory military training was introduced for men starting at age 18, with students being the first group to undergo it. Isn’t that a bit too late? Shouldn’t this decision have been made much earlier?

– Unfortunately, those who govern us often tend to have, let’s say, a somewhat limited intellectual capacity. In 2023, they abolished mandatory military service, only to reinstate it a year later in the form of compulsory military training. Obviously, we should have been preparing young men for war since 2022.

So that there would now be a trained reserve ready for deployment…

– Exactly. If you look at the war in Ukraine, the best infantry soldiers are in their early twenties. They are the most capable of enduring the extremely harsh conditions of combat.

But the Ukrainian government decided it was better not to disturb young people because that would have negative political consequences. As a result, we are the only country in the past 200 years that has not been training or drafting soldiers under the age of 25.

The U.S. had a tenfold industrial advantage during World War II and the Vietnam War. But even then, 21-year-olds were fighting on the front lines – because they were the best soldiers. Yet, in Ukraine, things are different. This is a unique example of how populism outweighs reality. The government still behaves as if we’re not facing an existential threat but as if elections are just around the corner, and these young people are needed at the ballot box rather than on the battlefield.

For the past three years, we should have been training young soldiers. By now, they would be, let’s say, 23 years old and ready to serve as a strong reserve force. And, of course, not every young man would have to be sent to the front lines. Drone warfare, security operations, border protection – these roles still require a significant number of people.

Populism is the greatest threat to the Ukrainian state. And that’s one of the most important lessons we should take from this war.

If we hypothetically assume that the war will end at some point, at least the "hot phase", the threat itself won’t disappear. Russia will still be there...

– Why should it end? I’m honestly baffled by questions about when the war will be over.

Will Ukraine have to take the Israeli approach when it comes to military service – where everyone undergoes training and forms part of the reserve?

– There’s no alternative to universal military training. It’s an absolute necessity. The only thing we can debate is its duration and intensity – so that people don’t have to go through three years of basic training like in Israel, but something more efficient. And we need to figure out how to maintain their combat readiness over time.

Israel conducts military exercises every year...

– That’s something that needs to be discussed and assessed financially. You can design any kind of ambitious training program, but you have to define its purpose. And, crucially, determine whether we have the resources to sustain it. This highlights a major problem – we have no real civilian oversight over how money and manpower are allocated.

How can that be changed?

– In Ukraine, public opinion is the only thing that drives change. I wrote an article about the 155th Brigade, and it caused an uproar among both the general public and the military community, where frustrations had already been building. That pressure forced Zelensky to stop sending people into these newly created units.

That’s how things work here. There’s no structured discussion, no in-depth analysis. There’s a scandal, a surge of likes, shares, and debates – and only then does a decision get made. If there’s no public outcry, nothing happens.

How can this problem be solved quickly?

– It can’t. We can’t change the government, and elections can’t be held during wartime. Our only option is to keep bringing these issues to light.

If we weren’t a democratic country, we would have lost this war long ago. In reality, this war is being fought by a people’s army – driven by the self-mobilization of citizens. And where does their motivation come from? The media.

Lately, many people have started to believe that a ceasefire might be on the horizon.

– I don’t see any basis for that. Why would Russia stop the war? They don’t have a problem with mobilization – there are still plenty of willing recruits. There are countless places in Russia where they can continue to draw people into the war, because for many, their own lives are already so bleak that war doesn’t seem any worse.

Of course, these are weak soldiers – unmotivated, focused on money, and thinking only about how to stay alive. Russia is already struggling to mobilize around 30,000 troops per month, but there’s still no shortage of recruits.

We can handle those numbers – we don’t have to eliminate all 150 million Russians. If we can inflict 40,000–50,000 irreversible losses on them each month, their offensive will grind to a halt.

What impact are North Korean soldiers having on the front?

– North Koreans are certainly a problem, but their presence doesn’t change the strategic picture. It’s just a few thousand additional troops thrown into the fight, but in modern technological warfare, that number doesn’t make a decisive difference. Besides, our soldiers have already taken out several Korean units.

I’m not a huge fan of this kind of question, but what’s your forecast for the near future?

– The enemy will continue making gradual advances in some areas. We don’t have enough troops, we lack sufficient weapons, and our forces are retreating. Sure, the Russians haven’t managed to break through the front lines – if you only look at the map, you might think the front is holding. But the front isn’t just lines on a map – it’s people. And we’re losing them.

Unfortunately, Ukraine still hasn’t built proper defensive lines where we could halt the enemy. That, too, is absurd.

People have been warning about this for months…

– More like years. It’s yet another example of populism, a lack of planning and accountability, and a failure to manage resources wisely. People sit in offices pretending to work, but no one actually measures their effectiveness.

Right now, our priority should be minimizing losses. At the moment, they’re too high – we can’t afford them. That’s why we need to create the right conditions for sustained defense. It’s possible, but it requires comprehensive, meticulous planning and organization.

Translation: Patrycja Eiduka