"This is Europe's final wake-up call": Globsec chief on defence and security

The Munich Security Conference ended on a highly mediatised note when its chair, Christoph Heusgen, nearly broke down in tears during a press conference. Does this reflect the true mood of the conference, or was it merely a media moment?

Róbert Vass: This year’s conference will go down in history as a milestone. The atmosphere was genuinely tense, with a palpable sense of anxiety that the world order Europeans and Americans built after the Second World War is disintegrating.

This is Europe’s final wake-up call. We must do more – the peace dividend we have been drawing from the Americans is definitively over. Several U.S. administrations have warned us about this, not just Trump’s.

It is now clear that if we do not want decisions about us to be made in Washington, Moscow, or elsewhere, we must make a fundamental increase in defence spending.

We need to strengthen European defence, stand on our own feet, and leave the "mama’s hotel" that the Americans have provided us since the Second World War.

Many have drawn parallels between this year’s Munich conference and Munich 1938. Numerous politicians warned against making the same mistake – pursuing a policy of appeasement towards an aggressor. Christoph Heusgen put it bluntly in his speech: "It didn’t work then, and it won’t work now."

How did the Americans behave off-camera? Was the atmosphere just as cold over coffee?

It was dramatic. We organised the debate ourselves, and it was exceptionally tense – especially between some European defence ministers and American officials. And that was a closed-door discussion.

Volodymyr Zelensky’s original meeting with J.D. Vance was cancelled and only took place after intense diplomatic efforts.

The Americans told the Ukrainians that Vance would not meet with them unless they signed an agreement on critical minerals. It then took an entire day of diplomacy to make it happen. It has never been this tense before.

Apart from Munich, you also visited Washington. How did experts and think tanks there react?

I was in Washington before Munich, and a lot has happened since then. At the time, the atmosphere was more one of waiting; many experts and think tanks were unsure about what would happen next. There was a great deal of uncertainty, which is why no major events were held. Ours was an exception.

The signals were positive – Keith Kellogg’s chief of staff attended our conference. Kellogg is Trump’s envoy for Ukraine and Russia. However, things have escalated significantly since then.

Can we discern any strategy in America’s current approach to Europe? The media express shock, but do cooler heads see a coherent strategic framework behind it?

The fact that the United States is unwilling to support a resolution condemning Russian aggression, even at the G7 or the UN level, is not a good sign. When the American president calls the Ukrainian president a dictator who started the war, it is difficult to see any clear strategy in that.

One thing is certain – Trump has disrupted the status quo in his own way, which is not necessarily a bad thing. But at this moment, it shows that Europe must learn to stand on its own feet.

Is an alliance forming between Washington and Moscow, or is there hope that we are witnessing a rough but essentially Kissinger-esque manoeuvre to ensure Moscow has better relations with Washington than with Beijing?

The Russians are very pleased with how things are unfolding. They have already secured what they wanted – and the talks haven’t even begun. Right from the start, they were granted direct negotiations with Washington, without Ukraine. That is a major development.

Secondly, Russia’s demands extend far beyond Ukraine; the location of the contact line is not the key issue. Some matters should be off the table from our side. No third party should have the power to dictate whether Ukraine can or cannot be part of NATO or the EU.

Europe must stand on its own two feet, take action, and do so swiftly. If barriers fell in Munich, then perhaps they must fall in Europe as well. To what extent is there political will in Europe to act collectively?

If we fail to maintain European unity, a coalition of the willing will emerge, pushing much further and forming a new defensive core within the European Union.

It is not out of the question that European bonds will be issued for this purpose, though not at the level of the entire EU.

This initiative will primarily revolve around the Nordic countries, Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states. France will undoubtedly join. No one will wait for nations unwilling to be part of it.

The consequence will be a divided Europe. A new core will take shape, and the key question will be who is in and who is out.

A new security core is forming in Europe, and everyone understands that this is the only way to strengthen the continent’s security.

Of the countries you mentioned, France is the only nuclear power. In Europe, the only other one is the United Kingdom. To what extent will they be willing to extend their nuclear umbrella beyond purely national interests to cover broader European concerns? Or have the Americans effectively triggered nuclear rearmament in Europe – because if Poland or Ukraine do not receive security guarantees from nuclear powers, the alternative might be to acquire nuclear weapons of their own?

At a time when Russia is threatening Europe with nuclear war and transatlantic trust is weakening, it is only natural that European countries are re-evaluating their approach to nuclear deterrence.

This will be a crucial issue – ensuring a sufficient European nuclear umbrella that also covers Central and Eastern Europe.

It matters who in Europe will fill the vacuum left by the United States. But equally important is the fact that we cannot completely detach ourselves from the U.S. In parallel, we must build our own strong pillar.

This is known as strategic parity—equivalence or balance.

If a European defence union is indeed emerging, it will need to achieve strategic parity with the United States. That means nuclear armament, aircraft carriers, submarines, and intelligence services. That will be quite the challenge.

One of the most significant indicators that Russia may be preparing for a broader confrontation with NATO is its systematic disruption of security at European bases in Germany. Professional drones have been flying over them, and we have also seen intrusions into naval bases. There have been instances of cables being cut – often labelled as hybrid operations, but these actions have a very tangible, physical nature.

This suggests that Russia is probing our responses, identifying weak points, and testing reaction times and cooperation. At the same time, it is building a new 1.5-million-strong army.

These signals are deeply concerning. They could indicate preparations for a larger confrontation with European and NATO countries. Some European security agencies estimate that Russia will be ready for such a scenario by 2029 at the latest.

We must not only increase defence spending but also significantly strengthen European capabilities and the protection of critical infrastructure.

At present, there is no unified European approach to safeguarding critical infrastructure, much of which is privately owned – ranging from mobile networks to undersea cables. I have spoken to several such companies, and no one has ever discussed security with them. We urgently need to establish a European system for protecting critical infrastructure.

How do experts at an event like the Munich Security Conference interpret the Slovak government’s actions and its approach to defence and NATO?

It is important to see the broader trend: Europe is strengthening its defence and building a European pillar.

No one will wait for us – it will be up to us whether we become part of it. The core can function without us. No one will pull us in or push us forward. What matters most is whether we choose to be part of that core or not.

The debate on Europe’s core and periphery is resurfacing for what feels like the third time. First, during the economic crisis of 2008–2009, then with the eurozone debt crisis, and now once again. Discussions have centred around a two-speed Europe or a division between the North and the South. In Slovakia, the prevailing paradigm has always been that, no matter what happens, the country must remain in the core, as its very existence depends on it. Today, the same debate touches on Slovakia’s direct security threat. But is there any real resolve in Slovakia to defend the country?

Public opinion polls suggest otherwise. The willingness is not particularly high – certainly not to the extent seen in Ukraine. But this is not just about Slovakia. Many countries in Europe share a similar outlook, having grown accustomed to peace and showing little readiness to defend themselves.

The situation is different in Sweden and Finland, where up to 90 percent of people are prepared to defend their country, and comprehensive national defence plans – including private sector involvement – are already in place. There is much to learn from these nations.

Where can Slovakia improve its security in the short term, such as by the end of this government’s term?

Slovakia is a country on a potential front line. If we are serious about our security and sovereignty, spending 2 percent of GDP on defence is simply not enough.

A swift decision is needed to increase defence spending, even though it is politically sensitive at a time of fiscal consolidation.

I believe the European response to these developments will not be at the national level but through a European budget that funds joint projects – such as a shared missile defence system and other areas where collective defence is crucial.

We urgently need the capabilities that have proven essential in Ukraine, including drones, missile defence, and similar technologies.

The NATO Secretary-General also spoke about defence spending percentages during his visit to Bratislava on February 20. However, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico did not meet with him. What message does that send?

I expect that at the NATO summit in The Hague (24–26 June, Ed.), a commitment will be made to gradually increase defence investment to 3.5 percent of GDP. Even 3 percent is no longer enough, and this is not just about meeting Trump’s demands.

Many parties and politicians who currently have good relations with Trump will have to listen when he says it should be 3 or even 3.5 percent. However, we must do this primarily for our own security, to stand on our own feet, and not simply because someone else demands it.

Last year, when asked about European armed forces, you said it only made sense if it did not come at NATO’s expense. Does that still hold, or has too much changed?

That question is no longer relevant today. The signals from America are crystal clear: strengthen yourselves, or we will leave. The European Union now bears enormous responsibility – and has the means to act. We must do it.

When the US president tells allies in Denmark that he does not rule out using military force to acquire Greenland, when we see the approach to Ukraine and are uncertain about America’s commitment to European security… In such a scenario, the only right decision is to bolster Europe’s security and establish a European army.

This should not come at the expense of relations with the Americans; rather, it should serve strategic parity and balance.

Denmark and Greenland rank among Donald Trump’s more bizarre ideas – perhaps alongside the Panama Canal. But can we distinguish which moves by the U.S. administration are simply the whims of an erratic politician and which represent genuine strategic shifts?

To some extent, I believe it’s a negotiation tactic, given that Greenland is rich in rare earth metals and other critical resources. Sooner or later, we’ll see numerous American companies mining them.

Greenland will either remain Danish territory or become independent. But Trump’s words are being closely monitored in Moscow and Beijing, with negative consequences for the global order.

If the United States is openly preparing for a confrontation with China and needs to focus its attention there, while Russia emerges stronger as a result, does that strategy work for them?

No. In America, I often hear the argument that China is their primary strategic adversary and that Russia’s war in Ukraine is merely a distraction from a much greater challenge.

But Russia’s war in Ukraine is, to a large extent, also about China. China supports and finances Russia, keeping its economy stable. As a result, Russia weakens Europe and America, while China learns valuable lessons. If we send the signal that we cannot defend a country on our own borders, who will believe anything we say about other parts of the world?

If we fail to keep Ukraine free and democratic, it sends a message to any future aggressor that they can simply get away with it.

Should European countries be prepared to physically enter Ukraine? Armies, aircraft, equipment, soldiers?

If a peace plan is established, it will need to be upheld, and Europeans must share responsibility for ensuring the agreement holds.

However, a ceasefire should not be mistaken for peace. In Munich, I sensed that few believe Putin is genuinely interested in a sustainable and just peace.

If we freeze the conflict in Ukraine with a ceasefire rather than securing a real peace that guarantees both Ukrainian and European security, Russia will shift its military and hybrid activities to Europe. The production of Russia’s war machine will not stop. Today, we see that Russia is waging war against Europe on multiple fronts.

We need a lasting peace, not just a ceasefire. If we confuse the two, we risk lifting sanctions and resuming trade with Russia before a real peace is in place. This would strengthen its economy and make us forget that we are not safe.

Putin’s demands go far beyond Ukraine; they challenge Europe’s entire security order. Let’s not forget that he issued an ultimatum for NATO to withdraw from Central Europe, including Slovakia and the Czech Republic, to pre-1997 borders. He seeks to turn countries like Slovakia and the Baltic states into a buffer zone. His actions make it clear that his interests and peace negotiations will not be about the front line.

Essentially, a second Yalta.

Yes, but these are the demands. Putin will never agree to Ukraine joining NATO. He will never accept a European army there. However, if we are to talk about a sustainable peace, these steps are essential.

So the only option is to disregard Putin and be strong enough to afford it?

Negotiations will take place – we must communicate and listen – but Ukraine and Europe must be at the table. We cannot allow the United States and Russia to reach an agreement about us without us.

If we don’t want decisions about us to be made in Moscow or Washington without our involvement, we must simply strengthen our own European defence.

When we spoke a year ago, you announced that the Globsec conference would be held in Prague for the first time. What is its future now?

Following last year’s success, we decided to establish a stronger presence in Prague. This year, we will celebrate 20 years since Globsec’s inception in Prague. There is clear interest across the political spectrum. At the same time, we have decided to open an office and establish a legal entity in the Czech Republic.

We are also looking at a greater presence in Poland and the Nordic countries, where we are in talks with several governments. Moving Globsec to Prague has undoubtedly strengthened it.

Has Trump’s suspension of USAID or US foreign aid affected Globsec?

No. We had no projects with USAID. We have research collaborations with other US partners, which are continuing without disruption – some have even been initiated this year.

Our conference in Washington two weeks ago was also highly successful, and we are pleased with our relationships across the political spectrum. Our Globsec foundation in the United States is expanding.

We have a highly diversified funding model, with over 80 private-sector partners, as well as collaborations with the EU, European institutions, and several governments.

No single partner provides more than 10 percent of our budget, and the majority contribute less than 5 percent, which ensures our independence. Today, Globsec is not reliant on any public funding.

We have invested significant effort in international expansion, diversification, and strengthening our partnerships. Moving the conference to the Czech Republic has reinforced this independence. In fact, we have seen growth and increased stability, further improving the diversification of our funding sources.

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