Dr. Michał Piekarski, Institute of International and Security Studies at the University of Wrocław: This is an extremely important body of water, full of critical communication routes, especially for the European economy. Beyond shipping, there are numerous undersea connections – pipelines, gas lines, power cables, and telecommunications infrastructure. And, though often overlooked amid the war in Ukraine, the tourism industry is also significant.
The war in Ukraine has finally made us realize the importance of security in this region, particularly when it comes to the Baltic's critical infrastructure, which is strategic in many ways.
– In July 2022, Russia published its naval doctrine, explicitly stating that maintaining its status as a maritime power is a strategic goal – including asserting dominance over the Baltic. Russia wants to preserve and even strengthen its influence in the region, which ultimately means controlling the sea and, by extension, influencing the countries along its shores. Moscow sees this sphere of influence as something it is simply entitled to.
– Russia exerts its will freely in the Baltic, and its hostile activities are escalating. We can expect further provocations.
– More acts of sabotage. Beyond the "accidental" severing of cables, we could see more overt sabotage—blowing up a gas pipeline, laying mines at port entrances, or a show of force under the guise of an "anti-terror operation". The Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats has developed a handbook on maritime threats, outlining 15 scenarios – all of which could be carried out by Russia.
– The maritime environment is very different from land. Legal regulations are different – such as the principle of freedom of navigation – which gives an adversary more room to maneuver, sometimes even with impunity.
Unfortunately, this makes the Baltic’s critical infrastructure highly vulnerable to threats and terrorist attacks.
On top of that, uncertainty has become a permanent element of hybrid warfare, keeping us in a constant state of tension.
– The Baltic is NATO territory, under the alliance’s military jurisdiction. But let’s not forget that NATO is a defensive alliance. In a hybrid war like the one Russia is waging now, NATO forces can only operate within peacetime legal frameworks. In practice, this means military action is heavily restricted, and civilian security services are bound by legal constraints.
NATO and its member states are not at war with Russia, so they cannot use the kinds of measures that would normally protect the Baltic’s critical infrastructure from destruction, damage, or attack. NATO cannot mine ports to curb the Baltic Fleet’s freedom of movement. It cannot simply blockade Russian vessels. Such preemptive military actions would be illegal during formal peacetime.
One potential solution would be a UN Security Council resolution – something the democratic world has used before to protect security in international waters. This was the case in the Persian Gulf after 1991 when Iraq was under an embargo that banned all trade except for medicine and food supplies. Back then, international forces had the right to inspect suspicious vessels.
– Patrolling, deterrence through military presence, and intercepting and inspecting vessels – but only if there is reasonable suspicion of legal violations, primarily those outlined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
– Civilian authorities take precedence. First and foremost, political decisions are made by government leaders, and the military carries them out. Secondly, since we are officially in a state of peace, the armed forces are primarily in a supporting role to civilian institutions.
At present, responsibility for securing critical infrastructure – such as gas pipelines or oil rigs – falls first on their owners, then on law enforcement, such as the Border Guard, and only in the third instance on the military.
– Militarily, NATO holds the upper hand, considering the combined strength of all European alliance members—from Finland to Spain, from Italy to the UK. In an open, conventional conflict, assuming full engagement from all NATO members, we could secure dominance over the Baltic.
– Available data suggests that in a full-scale war, Russia’s Baltic Fleet – even if reinforced by other hostile naval forces – could be wiped out. But that depends on NATO acting decisively and in unison. If that happens, the alliance can leverage its full potential: our coastal missile launchers, ship-based weapons, German submarines, the allied surface fleet, and our overwhelming air superiority.
– This is not a situation where NATO forces can legally fire missiles at a ship, vessel, or oil platform.
– Unfortunately, yes. Russia operates in a legal gray zone, exploiting the space between peacetime and open war. You can't stop an "accidental" cable cut with anti-ship missiles.
– Since there’s no declared war, the perpetrators can simply say, "Sorry, bad weather" or "Crew error", and pretend nothing happened. Even if we catch them red-handed, the question remains – under what legal framework do we hold them accountable? The laws here are vague and complex.
– So far, the incidents have been relatively minor – "coincidental" damage to undersea cables and strong suspicions of sabotage. But sooner or later, something more serious could happen. Imagine someone dragging an anchor or otherwise damaging the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline – and then refusing to stop when ordered. That would be a major crisis.
– First, fear – fear of losing access to gas for heating, daily use, and industry. That alone would create social unrest. And we can be sure Russia would immediately exploit that fear, fueling panic.
We would also lose one of our key gas import routes, making us vulnerable to further disruptions. While we do have reserves, they are limited. And once again, Russia would weaponize the situation with propaganda, with voices calling for a deal with Moscow, arguing, "We’ll get cheap and secure gas and oil if we just negotiate."
– Maybe we'll identify a suspect on radar or through the Automatic Identification System (AIS). But what if their vessel speeds toward Kaliningrad at full throttle and ignores our commands? We can’t just fire missiles at them. Our only option would be to chase them down and attempt to force them to stop – perhaps by boarding with special forces backed by naval ships.
What if something even more dangerous happens – like a ship feigning mechanical failure, only to scuttle itself in a port? That would block the harbor until the wreck could be cut apart and removed – a process that could take weeks. And what if someone lays mines at a port entrance? These unanswered questions highlight just how serious the security threats in the Baltic are.
– The best we can do is monitor for suspicious vessels and be ready to intervene at the first sign of a potential violation of international law. But that requires ships – a lot of ships.
– There’s no other way to protect European and NATO interests in the region. The Law of the Sea can’t be changed without Russia’s approval.
– Absolutely. The sea is crucial for trade, shipping, and transporting resources – including gas and oil – via underwater pipelines. It also carries electricity and internet communications. Beyond that, the sea is a tool of national power and influence on the global stage.
A country’s ability to secure its maritime domain reflects its overall civil and military strength. That’s why military protection of critical Baltic infrastructure is a top priority. Given Russia’s aggressive actions during the war in Ukraine, this cannot be done without the military – without soldiers. Civilian protection of ports and shipping is simply not enough.
– The security of these submarine cables, which enable global communication, has become a cornerstone of geopolitical independence and the functioning of national economies in an era of hybrid warfare and cyber conflict.
For Poland, the Baltic Sea is also about seaports – our economy depends on their operation. It’s about the gas pipeline and the LNG terminal, which guarantee the continuity of our economic activity. Unfortunately, as is often the case, it took a serious threat for most of our political class to recognize the gravity of the situation.
There's a term for this: seablindness – the failure to recognize the importance of maritime issues. Successive governments spent their time arguing over historical disputes instead of securing our future.
– Experts, people connected to the sea, and those professionally involved with the Navy have been warning about these threats for years. Their concerns included the Navy’s diminishing role in ensuring security in the Baltic. Now, those warnings are being proven right.
Not all Baltic states have neglected the issue. The Finns have been building new warships, including large corvettes, for years. The Swedes have maintained their submarine capabilities and are planning to build new surface vessels. Germany has kept its naval forces at a stable, high level.
Large NATO fleets were significantly reduced after the Cold War, but that doesn’t mean they were abandoned altogether. Sweden developed the Visby-class stealth corvettes – light, fast vessels with low detectability and underwater capabilities. Denmark gave up submarines 20 years ago but built a series of surface ships, including the large Iver Huitfeldt-class missile frigates, which are effective in times of peace, crisis, and war alike.
– It's catastrophic.
– We've managed to establish only the most basic capabilities—such as surface surveillance. In the 1990s, an integrated coastal observation system was developed for the Border Guard and the Navy. We’ve improved our search and rescue capabilities by acquiring patrol planes and rescue helicopters.
But over the past 25 years, the Navy has received only four new ships. The rest are used vessels, like the Kobben-class submarines from Norway or missile frigates from the U.S., or ships obtained through modifications of previously built hulls.
We do have strong mine-countermeasure capabilities, but when it comes to acquiring surface ships – corvettes, frigates – or submarines, decisions have either not been made or have been constantly changed, sometimes at the last minute – like the plan to buy frigates from Australia.
– A lack of awareness, knowledge, and strategic thinking. As a result, no political decision was ever made to allocate adequate funding to naval forces. Decision-makers – persuaded even by some military commanders – focused on developing the Air Force and the Army. And so, the fundamental principle of balancing threats through proportional development of all branches of the armed forces was completely disregarded.
The modernization of Poland’s armed forces has been inconsistent. Over the past 25 years, nearly every branch of the military has had its own flagship modernization program that reshaped its structure.
The Air Force got F-16s. The Army got Leopard tanks and Rosomak armored vehicles – major changes that required a deep reorganization of the military.
– The Navy never had such a flagship program for its ships. There was no money for the "Gawron" corvette program – we managed to build just one vessel, and even that with fewer capabilities than originally planned. No one told the tank commanders that Leopards were "too heavy for Poland" or the Air Force that F-16s "fly too fast". But the Navy was constantly told that corvettes and frigates were "too big for the Baltic".
Mine countermeasure ships are an important part of the fleet, but they are support vessels. For a long time, the Baltic was considered a calm, uneventful sea where nothing would ever happen.
The armed forces consist of five branches – land forces, the Air Force, the Navy, the Territorial Defense Forces, and special operations forces. How many times in the past 30 years has a naval officer been the Chief of the General Staff?
– The highest-ranking military officer in Poland has always come from the land forces. The same goes for commanders of the General and Operational Commands. Despite years of talk about "joint operations", naval officers have been vastly underrepresented among top decision-makers. And that directly impacts military priorities and key decisions.
– Territorial waters are just one part of the maritime areas we are responsible for. There’s also the contiguous zone beyond our territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone. These areas are crucial for protecting our shipping routes and critical infrastructure. We are responsible for defending our rights and interests, and no one else will do it for us.
There are also maritime regions of economic importance to us that don’t belong to Poland in a legal sense – such as the Norwegian Sea, home to the gas fields that supply us via the Baltic Pipe. Ensuring the security of these shipping routes is a matter of vital national interest. But to do that, we need a strong Navy.
- The most crucial element in protecting our interests in the Baltic is a fleet of multi-role warships, supplemented by mine countermeasure vessels, reconnaissance ships, air forces, and finally, submarines. This was all outlined back in 2017 in the Polish Strategic Maritime Security Concept (pol. Strategiczna Koncepcja Bezpieczeństwa Morskiego RP).
– There’s always a chance – if the money is there. If politicians have finally realized how vital the Navy is to our security, both militarily and economically, then there’s hope. The bad news is that rebuilding the fleet will take a very long time.
Right now, we’re in the process of building our first missile frigate under the "Miecznik" program. It will take over a decade before all three ships are completed, commissioned, and their crews fully trained.
– When it comes to submarines, we’re still in the process of selecting a supplier. The "Orka" program has been dragging on for over a decade.
– But we’ve known for 20 years that new submarines are essential. The Norwegian Kobben-class boats were only ever meant as a stopgap until we bought new ones. Yet here we are, in 2025, still debating who we might buy them from, what capabilities they should have, and what their propulsion, equipment, and armaments should be.
Right now, Poland has only one submarine, ORP Orzeł, which was purchased in the late 1980s and should have been replaced long ago. Every day without a decision on this matter is a wasted day.
– Politicians. There have been concrete proposals for acquiring specific types of vessels, but no action was ever taken. And no one has been held accountable.
Some decisions were made that created an illusion of naval capability, such as acquiring used vessels – American frigates, Norwegian submarines – or investing in a coastal missile division, later expanding it to a second unit. There was also the decision to develop mine countermeasure ships, which is now yielding results.
But the biggest problem has been the lack of a consistent maritime security policy. The 2017 Strategic Maritime Security Concept, published by the National Security Bureau, clearly stated that Poland needs a fleet capable of achieving local superiority in the Baltic. It called for missile frigates, submarines, and mine countermeasure forces.
At the very end of Antoni Macierewicz’s tenure as Minister of Defense, a separate document called the "Defense Concept" was published.
– And the former Minister of Defense’s concept essentially declared that Poland didn’t need a Navy – only mine countermeasure forces at best. The Ministry of Defense at the time explicitly stated that it had no interest in seeking maritime superiority or projecting power.
So, two institutions responsible for national security policy issued two completely contradictory documents. The result? Total chaos.
– Based on public statements, it seems like a shift is happening, but it’s time for concrete decisions. And we still don’t know what will happen with the "Orka" program.
The programs for mine countermeasure ships ("Kormoran") and frigates ("Miecznik") are moving forward, as are reconnaissance ships. But what about the program for maritime patrol aircraft? What about acquiring new naval helicopters? After the "Caracal" purchase was scrapped, Poland’s naval aviation was left without modern patrol and rescue helicopters. Four AW101 helicopters were eventually purchased, but that’s far from enough. Tensions in the Baltic are rising, and we need more equipment.
– Right now, our main contribution is mine countermeasure operations. Polish ships have taken part in NATO mine warfare groups, and Polish officers have commanded them. But when it comes to underwater and aerial operations, we have serious gaps. Our ships are aging, and we are increasingly reliant on external support. And that support is coming – Italian ships have contributed to Baltic security, and just recently, a Dutch frigate visited our port.
From a combat perspective, beyond our single submarine, Poland has three small missile boats, which are primarily useful in conventional warfare as floating missile launchers. We have two frigates, but they are over 40 years old. We have one anti-submarine corvette, "ORP Kaszub", which will be retired in a few years, and one patrol corvette, "ORP Ślązak", which we are only now working to equip properly.
– As an expert and a taxpayer, I just want to see these decisions actually implemented. For now, we’re still in the stage of discussing projects that have been included in the Navy’s modernization program.
This means that despite having some capabilities, Poland is still more of a security consumer in the Baltic than a provider.
There’s growing awareness of maritime issues, but enthusiasm alone won’t make up for years of neglect. Naval programs require time, stability – both political and financial – and a long-term commitment.
Translation: Patrycja Eiduka
This article was written in the framework of The Eastern Frontier Initiative (TEFI) project. TEFI is a collaboration of independent publishers from Central and Eastern Europe, to foster common thinking and cooperation on European security issues in the region. The project aims to promote knowledge sharing in the European press and contribute to a more resilient European democracy.
Members of the consortium are 444 (Hungary), Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland), SME (Slovakia), PressOne (Romania), and Bellingcat (The Netherlands).
The TEFI project is co-financed by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor EACEA can be held responsible for them.
