The new world order: the strong prey on the weak

While even ordinary people in their everyday lives can sense that something is changing in the world, headlines like the above are becoming increasingly common in the international press. Trump has thrown himself into his second presidency with tremendous momentum. From a journalistic point of view, the few hours of relative calm when the president is asleep on the other side of the ocean are a blessing. Trump's pace is unabated, and the effects on our world (and the world order) are becoming ever more palpable.

But how can we describe the world order we are currently living in, and why is it like this? What might come after the Trump-tornado?

Eurasia at the heart of history

The Eurasian continent has been at the centre of key conflicts in history, which is not surprising: it is home to most of the world's population, economic resources and military potential. Eurasia's shores are washed by all four oceans, which transport goods and weapons/armies to all corners of the world. The current world order has been built on the ruins of the devastation of the two world wars and the Cold War. The USA, that has played an active role in keeping Eurasia's peace after the wars, rather than withdrawing, has been the protagonist of this world order. The existence of the American alliance deterred aggressive ambitions against the industrially dynamic peripheries of Eurasia - Western Europe and East Asia - while older tensions were kept relatively low. The results of this order also contributed to the fall of the

Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a unipolar era emerged in which Washington sought to make its own system global, expanding its Eurasian alliances, and promoting the spread of democracy and free market economy in Eastern Europe and other regions. The post-Cold War alliance with the US probably prevented a rapid return to global rivalry, maintaining severe inequalities but making the world a freer, richer and more humane place. But lasting peace in Eurasia remained out of reach. For illiberal states with imperial (re)visions, the liberal order seemed oppressive. China and Russia used the prosperity fostered by the US-led regime to finance new geopolitical challenges.

From Eastern Europe to East Asia, powers seeking to revise the international order are becoming increasingly active (see Russia in Ukraine, Iran in the Middle East, China in the South China Sea). They are also trying to destroy the liberal order, shattering its most important norm: the strongest can do anything to weaker neighbours. The decline of a world based on international law and multilateralism offers an opportunity for each of them to achieve their goals, so they watch with bated breath as the US changes course under Donald Trump.

Eighty years

The US-led international system, now in decline, has ensured great power peace, prosperity and the spread of democratic ideals for eighty years. After the West's victory in the Cold War, Washington sought to make this order global and permanent.

In the two and a half decades since the end of the Cold War, globalism has also gained ground, while the rise of increasingly complex systems and networks - institutional, financial and technological - has eclipsed the role of the individual in politics. The early 2010s, however, brought a change. Some charismatic personalities, harnessing the tools of the 21st century, revived the archetypes of the previous century: the strong leader, the great nation, the proud civilisation. In Russia, Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, after four years of 'exile' as prime minister; in 2013, Xi Jinping became president of China; in 2014, Narenda Modi began to implement Hindu nationalism as prime minister in India; in the same year, prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan became president of Turkey; and in 2016, Donald Trump became US president for the first time. Although it has lesser importance in global politics, Viktor Orbán's overwhelming victory with a two-thirds majority in 2010 should not be left out of this list either.

Recent years have been marked by a decline in democratic ideals anyway, but this could be radically accelerated by Trump's recent and upcoming decisions. This is significant because the balance of ideas in the world also reflects the balance of power.

Trust

The strength of the United States, at least within the Western world, especially in Eastern Europe, has been built on trust. Its allies trusted that it would honour treaties, guarantee promised protection and maintain world order. But that trust has been lost, especially within its own circle: Trump's first moves have hit his own allies, from Canada to Ukraine. Whatever Trump promises (or does not promise), the question will always remain: what if he changes his mind the next day? What if he promises a defence guarantee to Ukraine and then does not keep his word? If today Trump seems to accept Russia's claims to its European sphere of influence, why wouldn’t he make a deal with China over the heads of the USA’s Asian allies? What is an American promise worth in 2025? Of course, it takes more than a US president ranting in short social media posts to break an eight-decade-long relationship that permeates virtually every layer of our lives, especially in a globalised - albeit fracturing - world.

In addition to security and military relations, corporate, commercial, economic, cultural and other relations are equally important. Obviously, the degradation of transatlantic security relations will affect other areas as well, with very tangible economic consequences. Such a repercussion was, for example, the Portuguese refusal to ask the Americans for F-35 fighter jets, which cost over a hundred million dollars each, on the grounds that they have to take account of the predictability of their allies.

Based on the experiences of the first months, Trump seems to be seeing the future in unilateral decisions. He began his second presidency by taking on his allies one by one. According to political scientist Joseph Nye, the US president is "so obsessed with the problem of free riders that he forgets that it has been in America’s interest to drive the bus." Trump is wrong if he thinks Washington doesn't need alliances. But he is right that its European and Asian allies, facing different threats, need the US more than vice versa, and this would give him the opportunity to renegotiate existing security pacts.

It is strength that counts, not the truth of the weak Not long after J.D. Vance lectured the leaders of Europe in Munich, there was another moment when it felt like history was in the making. Donald Trump and J.D. Vance wiping the floor of the Oval Office with the Ukrainian President was such a performance. So far, the basis of the Ukrainian position has been that they are a country under attack, they are right morally and also from an international law point of view, and this stance was accepted by the members of the Western alliance system. When Vladimir Putin launched the Russian army against sovereign Ukraine on 24 February 2022, he trampled on the international order that was based on the foundations of the collective experience of the Second World War, the respect for borders and laws.

If the conclusion to be drawn from the Russia-Ukraine war is that borders are not to be respected and the laws of the jungle will prevail, that is a huge step backwards for international peace and security.

The truth of the Ukrainians is only worth anything as long as there is faith in international institutions and multilateralism. Donald Trump does not believe in these things, he likes strength, not being right, and he is spectacularly at odds with the truth anyway. Everything is a zero-sum game, breaking the rules is acceptable, just as the acquisition of territory, as shown by the case of Greenland. There is a new sheriff in town.

If Trump continues with his current destructive policies, the United States will not be a superpower distancing itself from international affairs, but a renegade - a country more aggressive and illiberal than at present, fomenting and feeding global chaos, helping its enemies to break the system it has created and led for a long time.

Destructive tornado, looters, bigger dogs

Members of the Hungarian governing parties probably don't even think about how apt the term Trump-tornado is. If they had thought about it, and if their goal was to actually defend Hungary's much-vaunted sovereignty, their behaviour would be very different.

After all, a tornado destroys everything in its path. It leaves chaos in its wake, looters appear on the ruins, and while some people may be able to profit from the reconstructions (which takes

time), others (many more than the beneficiaries) will find themselves in a difficult situation, and some - typically the weakest - will be left in poverty forever. Only the strong can enforce their will and maintain order, and the world of the bigger dogs will come - the impact of the Trump-tornado on the international order can be compared to this. It seems that we are still in the process of destruction, so it is not yet clear what will replace the liberal world order that has been cracking and crumbling for years. According to Peter Pomerantsev, the best-known expert on Russian state propaganda, the idea of a multilateral world has become obsolete, and many are talking about a return to the 19th century, either in terms of cultural or historical paradigms. Pomerantsev believes that Putin and Trump think alike. Some may think that the US, Russia and China are redividing the world between themselves. But we no longer live in an era when only a few privileged powers had weapons and knowledge. If a multipolar world order is to emerge, it will not only have three poles, but many more, and any country can become a pole. Canada and Mexico have clearly shown that it is not as easy to get tough with them as Trump thought. This is why it is naive to think that the world will be arbitrarily divided up again. We live in much more dangerous times: everyone has a knife in their pocket.

The Trump-tornado will also affect the international institutions that have been the pillars of the world order. On the very first day of his second presidency, Trump withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council, the WHO and UNESCO, and in the same decree he decided that the US should review its membership of all (!) international organisations and all (!) international treaties it has signed, and within 180 days make a proposal on which should go out the window and which should not. If the tornado also destroys these institutions, then comes the time to re-design: by then the damage caused by the non-existence of these organisations will be seen, and they will be able to think about which ones are needed and which ones are not.

A changing European Union

This is where the question about the future of the European Union arises, which is the international organisation perhaps most directly affecting our lives. Since the US is not a member of the EU, the Trump-tornado will not sweep it away in the sense described above, but it will inevitably have an impact on it, given the situation that is now emerging: a world of bigger dogs, where the EU needs to demonstrate its strength in order not to become subservient to those stronger than it.

The EU's institutional system is, by its very nature and structure, much slower to move, more difficult to find common ground between different interests, and often only the bare minimum can emerge from these compromises. Currently, the EU is not strong, and will not be strong in its present form, precisely because of the need for common ground, and this raises questions about the success of the planned developments in defence policy. It is no coincidence that alternative, non-bureaucratic, non-institutional forms of cooperation that bypass veto options are coming to the fore.

The idea of a two-speed EU has been much talked about over the last decade, and it may take an external shock of similar magnitude to trigger a meaningful change in this area. You don't have to browse the news for long to realise that the Hungarian government does not want to be part of this movement.

Alone in a world of stronger dogs

Orban sees himself as someone who can reach both Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on the phone. Putin and, in recent weeks, Donald Trump have been working with great vigour to disrupt the existing world order and establish a world of big dogs, which does not bode well for a Hungary that is left alone. Orbán is currently being squeezed out of the European pack, which is not very strong in terms of defence cooperation, but is likely to grow stronger. In the field of defence, even if it does not go like a charm, the frameworks for a cooperation outside the EU will certainly be established. European countries have realized that the EU in its current form cannot defend Europe, and the decisions of the Hungarian government play a role in this. There needs to be a framework where there is no constant stick between the spokes in order to move forward. Orbán is truly bringing Europe together in the end, as the rest of the countries are feeling less and less inclined to pay the bill after him. From the Scandinavians to the Baltics to the Poles, a range of countries see Russia as a threat to their existence. Therefore, they do not want a close cooperation where they would experience Orbán pushing Russian propaganda and thus thwarting their efforts to self-defence.

It is precisely the existing world order, based on multilateralism and alliances, that has increased Orbán's weight in foreign policy. He was able to have a greater say in international affairs than it was fit for Hungary because he did not speak as the prime minister of an Eastern European country of 9.5 million people, but as the leader of a member state of the European Union that prefers unified decisions. However, his allies constantly had to push him to cooperate - with fine words and other means too - or else he vetoed. However, if a framework for cooperation outside the EU is established, in which Hungary does not participate, Orbán will lose his voice.

In a world where strength matters, the prospects are not too bright for a country of 9.5 million people that is economically crumbling, socially divided and frayed to the extreme and is alienating an ever-growing part of the continent. Thus, applauding Trump and Putin, who are upending our world, while mocking those who want to quickly pull together European defence cooperation, labelling them as pro-war and calling it an honour not to be invited to their meetings, seems unwise even by Orbanian standards. Orbán is very much like the US president he idolises in the sense that, just as the Trump-tornado destroys without any prospect of reconstruction, Orbán is destroying European initiatives. We do know what he does not want, but we do not know what concrete ideas he has for the future of European defence. Orbán is also destructive, but what he is building besides Hatvanpuszta (the luxurious estate of his family), we do not know.

While Orbán, who defines himself as a freedom fighter, is fighting against invisible empires with more and more serious incitements, he welcomes the fact that two "empires" are agreeing on a matter that affects Hungary's security to the core (the outcome of the war in Ukraine, or at least the terms of a ceasefire) over the head of the invaded neighbouring country. While Emmanuel Macron said in a televised speech addressing his country that Europe cannot afford to let Washington and Moscow decide its future, that seems to be exactly what the Hungarian government wants.

War against the West → war against Europe

The war between Russia and Ukraine is worth dwelling on for a moment, not only because it is so close to us that if it were any closer it would be taking place in Hungary. But also, because it is highly unlikely that peace in Ukraine will bring European Canaan. Both sides involved see the Russo-Ukrainian war as something that extends beyond Ukraine's borders. The Russians, according to their own interpretation, are at war with the West, and the Ukrainians argue that they are protecting the whole of Europe from the menace of Putin, and that their blood sacrifice will weaken Russia in the long term, which serves American strategic and geopolitical interests.

From the Russian perspective, the United States, which has been the villain so far, has not really given the Putin-regime any reason to be treated as a villain in the past few weeks. Therefore, the Russians have expressed their satisfaction with Trump's change of direction: spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that the changed US foreign policy ideas were largely in line with Russian ideas, and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Trump was the first Western leader who understood the Russian position on Ukraine.

In hybrid warfare broadly understood (including information- and cyber operations), the Russians have begun to shift their focus from America to Europe. Russia will direct all its energy and resources it has been expanding against the US until now, to Europe and Great Britain, primarily to undermine the new defence pact, as Peter Pomerantsev said in an interview with 444. Among the EU Member States, Germany and Poland could be prime targets, with Poland already being among the top three targets for cyber-attacks in the world. We will see what role Hungary will play in this game, how far the Russian Trojan horse will go.

From a European point of view, an even worse scenario is if not only Russia, but Russia and the United States will pressure Europe at the same time, in an attempt to break European unity. We can only speculate what Trump's vision of the world is, but it is clearer than ever that he does not like Europe or the European Union, claiming that it was only created to screw the Americans.

Still not war, but not peace anymore

There aren't too many countries in Europe that insist on spreading to anyone willing (or forced) to listen that either Donald Trump or a future ceasefire agreement in Ukraine will bring an era of peace. The Orbán-government is just that, with the prime minister having already announced on 26 February that peace has come.

European politicians and security policy experts, on the other hand, are warning that we are not at war, but we are not at peace either. We are rather living in a dangerous grey zone, where cyber-attacks against universities, hospitals and state institutions are happening daily, where sabotage, Internet cable cuts and Russian trolls filling the online space with disinformation are becoming more and more common.

Europe is not at war with Russia, but the Russians are fighting a war against Europe. A hybrid war. As the Dutch Defence Minister said in his speech in Paris, if a hybrid car is a car, then a hybrid war is a war as well. European countries must be able to defend themselves against these kinds of threats too, but this burdens a much bigger circle than the military. It is a task for the whole of society to become more resilient to threats that have never been seen before (internet, electricity, drinking water). The commander of the Polish cyber defence forces had similar observations: there have been ongoing conflicts in Polish cyberspace since the invasion of Ukraine, but he does not consider this a war yet. However, if cyber-attacks result in loss of life, for example by attacking hospitals or critical infrastructure, he believes that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty could be invoked. The rules for this, however, should be jointly defined as soon as possible.